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CHAPTER I
Comparing Revenue from Auctions and Posted Prices
I analyze the market for compact discs using an original data set of items listed for sale online. Over
5,000 listings of both new and used compact discs were collected from eBay (which provides sellers
a choice between two mechanisms: auction or posted price) and its subsidiary, Half.com (which
features only posted prices). Despite the often cited revenue-dominance property of auctions, many
sellers choose to post a fixed price. To explain this anomaly, I examine empirically the determinants
of the revenue earned by sellers in this market. I find that posted-price goods sell for higher prices,
while auctioned goods sell with a higher probability. Further results suggest that the size of a seller’s
inventory is the key factor in the choice between selling in an auction and posting a fixed price. In
particular, sellers with large inventories are more likely to use the posted-price mechanism.
Introduction
Browsing through online marketplaces such as eBay, potential buyers encounter
numerous goods, some of which are being auctioned, others selling at a posted price. This co-
existence of auctions and other selling mechanisms presents a puzzle to economists. Namely,
if auctions raise more revenue than other selling mechanisms, why aren’t more goods being
auctioned? I approach this question using data from eBay, and its subsidiary, Half.com.
On a given day, nearly 500,000 compact discs are available for purchase on eBay. Though
it is commonly thought of as an auction website, eBay sellers may also sell their goods at a
posted price. Unlike eBay, Half.com allows its users to sell only at a posted price and only
certain types of goods: CDs, books, movies, and video games. Drawing from a sample of
49 albums, I collected over 5,000 listings of both new and used compact discs from the two
sites. Approximately 60% of the data are posted-price goods, confirming that coexistence is
present in this market. Using this original data set, I estimate the effect of a seller’s mech-
anism choice on the outcomes of interest: a good’s revenue, selling price, and probability of
sale.
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One of the central results in auction theory is the revenue dominance of auctions,
given a monopolistic market in which symmetric buyers have private values and indepen-
dent signals (Myerson 1981). Auctions are not always optimal however. Once buyer
symmetry (Myerson 1981) or the independence of the information structure (Cre´mer and
McLean 1985) is relaxed, auctions fail to maximize revenue but they still revenue domi-
nate posted-price selling. Relaxing the assumption of private values, Campbell and Levin
(2006) show that posted-price selling can revenue dominate auctioning when buyers’ values
are sufficiently interdependent. Wang shows that posted-price selling can revenue dominate
auctioning when there is a fixed cost for holding an auction and buyers’ values are not too
dispersed.1
The empirical regularities of these data suggest that a simple revenue-dominance
story masks the fact that auctions have advantages and disadvantages relative to posted-
price selling. While I find revenue equivalence between the auction and posted-price mech-
anisms, there are interesting differences when analyzing the two components of revenues
separately. Specifically, the posted-price mechanism earns 11% higher prices than the auc-
tion mechanism. Further, I find some evidence that auctioneers are compensated for a
lower selling price with a higher probability of sale, but the effect is only economically and
statistically meaningful in the sample of only eBay items.
I then turn to an examination of the mechanism choices of the sellers in the online
compact-disc market. To explain why the auction and posted-price mechanisms coexist, I
focus on sellers’ inventories. The importance of inventories is illustrated by two papers from
the literature. Harris and Raviv (1981) find that if the number of goods in a monopolist’s
inventory exceeds potential demand, a posted price is optimal. If the inventory is smaller
1Another set of related papers deal with Buy-It-Now auctions, a hybrid mechanism combining elements
of an auction and posted-price selling. See Anderson et al (2004); Wang et al (2004); and Reynolds and
Wooders (2009).
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than potential demand on the other hand, selling in an auction is optimal. The rationale for
this result is that an auction can only profitably exploit the scarcity of a seller’s inventory
when it is scarce.
Zeithammer and Liu (2006) study a monopolist with either one or two units, where
goods are of one of two types. They find that a monopolist with a heterogeneous inventory
prefers the auction mechanism, while a homogeneous inventory favors posted-price selling.
The degree of heterogeneity is important because, in their model, offering a posted price
imposes a fixed cost on the seller that is incurred only once per type of item, while auctioning
imposes a cost that must be paid once for each auction that the seller offers. Having more
types of items (i.e., a more heterogeneous inventory) favors the auction mechanism.
I use these two characteristics of a seller’s inventory to explain the results of this
paper. I find that sellers differ in the size and the heterogeneity of their inventories but
that inventory size is the key determinant of whether a seller chooses to sell in an auction
or at a posted price. Consistent with the arguments of Harris and Raviv, sellers with large
inventories choose to post a fixed price. I do not find support for the inventory-heterogeneity
hypothesis of Zeithammer and Liu and conclude that the size of a seller’s inventory is the
most important factor in the mechanism choices of eBay compact-disc sellers. I now describe
the data.
Data
Summary statistics are in Table 1 and detailed descriptions of all variables are in
Appendix I.8. The sample contains 5,009 items over 49 albums listed for sale between
August 1 and October 5, 2005. For the week of August 14-20, 2005, 10 albums were
3
randomly selected from each of the following lists: the Billboard 100, Amazon’s Top 100, and
Amazon’s Top 100 Indie.2 The Amazon lists are based solely on sales at Amazon.com, while
Billboard ranks sales in both brick-and-mortar stores and online retailers. The remaining 30
albums were selected from an unrestricted population of all albums ever produced (excluding
classical music), randomly selected from the All Music Guide (Bogdanov et al 2002). From
these 60 albums, 9 were never released on compact disc and 2 albums were never listed for
sale on either site during the sample period, leaving data for 49 albums.
Institutional Features of eBay and Half.com
The most common way for sellers to list their items on eBay is in an ascending-bid,
second-price (English) auction with a fixed end time. The auction length is set by the seller
and can be 1, 3, 5, 7, or 10 days. If an item has received multiple bids when its end time is
reached, it is sold to the highest bidder at the second highest bid (plus one bid increment).
If the item has received only one bid, it is sold to the lone bidder at the reserve price.
Finally, if the item has not received any bids, it does not sell and is retained by the seller.
Potential buyers who search for a particular item on eBay are shown all open
listings matching the search criteria. They observe the standing bid (the second highest of
the bids already placed), shipping cost, number of bids already placed, and end time. The
shipping cost is set by the seller and ranges from free shipping to upwards of five dollars in
these data. A potential buyer observes the (public) reserve price, which is also set by the
seller. The standing bid is equal to the reserve price until a bid is placed and bids below
the reserve price are not accepted.3
2An album is considered “indie” (independent) if it is published by a company that is not a member of the
Recording Industry Association of America (the trade group that represents the U.S. recording industry).
3eBay auctioneers may also employ a secret reserve price. Potential bidders observe the public reserve
and may bid any amount above it. If the auction ends with the highest bid below the secret reserve price,
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
eBay eBay
All Half.com Posted Price Auction
Dependent Variables:
Selling Price $10.74 $9.78 $12.42 $10.34
(3.921) (3.470) (3.878) (3.885)
Pr(Sale) 63.8% 32.9% 87.6% 87.7%
(0.481) (0.470) (0.330) (0.329)
Seller Characteristics:
Score 15,771.00 17,760.14 18,305.31 12,269.51
(43,233.096) (36,751.293) (47,074.812) (47,724.425)
Rating 98.7% 98.1% 99.2% 99.2%
(0.030) (0.031) (0.033) (0.026)
Inventory Size 14.29 18.98 16.98 7.62
(21.484) (27.095) (14.580) (14.028)
Inventory Homogeneity 0.638 0.504 0.658 0.780
(0.391) (0.437) (0.310) (0.310)
Buyer Characteristics:
Score 230.08 262.58 214.66
(576.535) (706.190) (501.439)
Rating 98.9% 99.0% 98.8%
(0.063) (0.054) (0.067)
Item Characteristics:
New CD 57.4% 55.3% 81.0% 48.5%
(0.494) (0.497) (0.393) (0.500)
Scratched CD 1.9% 2.3% 0.2% 2.3%
(0.137) (0.151) (0.047) (0.149)
No Description 7.8% 11.4% 2.4% 6.4%
(0.269) (0.317) (0.153) (0.245)
Promotional CD 5.5% 5.1% 2.9% 7.1%
(0.227) (0.220) (0.169) (0.257)
Case Damaged 0.9% 1.0% 0.8% 0.9%
(0.096) (0.100) (0.087) (0.097)
Case Missing 1.1% 1.3% 0.4% 1.1%
(0.102) (0.113) (0.066) (0.104)
Recently-Released Album 58.7% 51.1% 65.7% 64.0%
(0.492) (0.500) (0.475) (0.480)
Observations 5,009 2,183 920 1,906
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. For all analyses, the selling price is equal
to the price at which the item sold plus shipping minus all fees paid by the seller. Buyer
characteristics are only observed on eBay. See Appendix I.8 for a discussion of each
variable. The following items were excluded from all analyses: items listed on Half.com
during the last 7 days of the sample period (54 items) and unsold items listed on eBay as
auctions with a Buy-It-Now price (323 items).
5
Instead of selling in an auction, an eBay seller may post a fixed price. A buyer
who searches for a certain album is shown all copies available for purchase and it is made
clear which mechanism is being used for each item. As with auctions, there is a fixed
end time for posted-price items. But unlike auctions, the buyer can win a posted-price
item immediately by choosing to pay the seller’s specified price. As mentioned in footnote
1, eBay also offers a hybrid of the two mechanisms studied here, known as a Buy-It-Now
auction. My focus is on a comparison between pure auctions and pure posted-price sales,
as these are common mechanisms found in a wide range of on and oﬄine settings. As a
result, I ignore Buy-It-Now auctions in my analysis and exclude unsold Buy-It-Now items
(323 items) from all summary statistics and regression analyses.
Half.com allows sellers to list only at a posted price. Buyers can search for any
item as they would on eBay.4 After entering their search terms, Half.com buyers view all
copies of the album available for purchase on Half.com. Shipping is fixed at $2.49. An
important distinction between eBay and Half.com is the interpretation of an unsold item.
For eBay, these items were listed for a fixed period of time (typically seven days) during
which they were available to buyers. For the unsold eBay items in the data set, their
window closed without attracting a buyer. For Half.com on the other hand, items are
available until they sell, meaning that an unsold item has simply not sold yet. I take this
difference into account by excluding from all analyses those Half.com items listed within
seven days from the close of the sample period.5
the item does not sell. Secret reserves are rarely used in these data (7 listings; < 1% of all auctions) and
are therefore ignored.
4Given the popularity of the “Music→CD” category, most albums are available for purchase on both
sites at all times. Only 2 of the 51 albums randomly selected for this study were unavailable from either
site and only 1 album was available from one site but not the other; Bing Crosby “Swingin’ with Bing” was
listed on Half.com only.
5Seven days was used because it is the modal length of an eBay listing.
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eBay and Half.com profit from their role as intermediaries by charging fees to
sellers; buyers pay nothing to eBay/Half.com to join or use either site. eBay has three
types of seller fees: insertion fees, final value fees, and fees for optional features. Insertion
fees are paid by the seller for listing an item whether or not the item sells. The fees are as
follows: $0.20 for items with a reserve price between $0.01-$0.99, $0.40 for $1.00-$9.99, $0.60
for $10.00-$24.99, and $1.20 for $25.00-$49.99. Final values fees are paid as a percentage
of the selling price (excluding shipping) for sold items. The fees are 5.25% of the selling
price for all prices below $25.00, plus 3.25% of any amount above $25.00. eBay sellers pay
a $0.05 to $0.25 fee for introducing a posted-price option, depending on the price posted.
Half.com sellers incur fees only at the time of sale, with fees of 15% for items that sell for
a price (excluding shipping) below $50.00 and 12.50% for prices above $50.00. I construct
a dependent variable equal to the log of the selling price plus shipping minus fees.6
Overview of the Outcomes
First note in Table 1 the prices at which goods sell, where eBay posted-prices items
outperform eBay auctions but both outperform Half.com items. The probability of sale
statistics show a clear tendency for items on eBay to sell with a higher frequency but the
effect of the mechanism is ambiguous. Concerning new versus used items, Table 2 suggests
that the dominance of eBay posted prices over eBay auctions is much larger for brand-new
items. Further, t-tests indicate that the price differences across eBay posted-price items
and eBay auctions is significant only for brand-new items (t statistic of 7.73 for new items
versus 1.34 for used). For the probability of sale, Table 2 again indicates that eBay items
6The regression analysis is robust to using price as the dependent variable with shipping and fees as
controls.
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Table 2. Dependent Variables by New/Used Items
eBay eBay
All Half.com Posted Price Auction
New Items:
Selling Price $12.07 $11.12 $13.12 $11.56
(3.837) (3.220) (3.736) (3.924)
Pr(Sale) 59.8% 22.6% 86.6% 86.7%
(0.490) (0.419) (0.341) (0.340)
Observations 2,877 1,207 745 925
Used Items:
Selling Price $9.20 $8.96 $9.60 $9.24
(3.419) (3.364) (3.087) (3.500)
Pr(Sale) 69.2% 45.7% 92.0% 88.6%
(0.462) (0.498) (0.272) (0.318)
Observations 2,132 976 175 981
sell with a higher frequency than Half.com items. Though new items are less likely to sell
than used items in all categories, the differences in the likelihoods of sale across mechanism
seem to be independent of whether the item is new or used.
Rationales for in which mechanism an item is listed fall into three categories: seller-
specific, buyer-specific, or item-specific explanations. First, one might wonder if there exist
discernible differences between auctioneers and sellers who post fixed prices. The seller
panel of Table 1 suggests that posted-price sellers have higher scores than auctioneers and
eBay sellers have higher ratings than Half.com sellers (with both differences statistically
significant). Inventories are also meaningfully different across the three outlets: posted-
price sellers have larger and more heterogeneous inventories.
Buyer-specific explanations can only be explored using eBay data because Half.com
does not provide any information about buyers. From the buyer panel of Table 1, auction
buyers look reasonably similar to posted-price buyers; neither the difference in scores nor in
ratings is significant at the 5% level. Finally, the most striking feature in the item panel of
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Table 1 is that posted-price items on eBay are significantly more likely to be brand new, a
fact that does not appear attributable to mechanism (does not hold for Half.com) or website
(does not hold for eBay auctions). This leads to a meaningfully smaller fraction of items
with negative attributes sold at a posted price on eBay.
Though it makes little sense to draw definitive conclusions from summary statis-
tics, the set of hypotheses concerning seller-specific heterogeneity seems most powerful in
explaining the choice of mechanism in these data. The econometric analysis exploits this
fact and is discussed now.
Estimation Strategy
The outcomes of interest are the revenue, selling price, and sale dummy (equal to
one for sold items) for each of the 5,009 items in the data set.
Selling Price of Unsold Items
A good’s selling price is a latent variable because all items have a price (possibly
negative) at which they would sell but that price is unobserved for unsold items. This
empirical problem can be accounted for in one of two ways. First, I could assume that
an unsold item has a true selling price strictly below its reserve price (or posted price for
non-auction items); this assumption generates a censored-regression model. Second, I could
assume that the true selling price is completely unobserved when an item does not sell and
therefore use a sample-selection model of the selling price. Either assumption may be valid
under alternative market environments, leading me to use the Vuong (1989) likelihood-ratio
test for non-nested models to find the model that is closer to the truth. The results indicate
that the sample-selection model is more appropriate (z=-64.46, p-value=1.00). As a result,
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I treat the selling price of unsold items as completely unobserved and use a Heckman (1979)
selection model.7
Endogeneity of Mechanism/Website
The next econometric issue to address is the endogeneity of the seller’s mechanism
choice problem. There are two arguments for why the mechanism and website may be
endogenous. First, sellers should form expectations of the revenue from each mechanism
when deciding auction versus posted price and likewise, eBay versus Half.com. If factors
that are unobserved (by the econometrician) influence the way in which sellers form these
expectations, then the mechanism and website are endogenous. Second, if covariates that
are unobserved by the econometrician affect the mechanism choice as well as the outcomes
of interest, then endogeneity is present.
To address this problem, I use seller-specific covariates as instruments, specifically
focusing on sellers’ inventories. Harris and Raviv (1981) highlight the crucial role that the
size of a seller’s inventory plays in the choice between auctioning and posted-price selling.
They show that a seller prefers to post a fixed price only when her inventory is larger than
potential demand. Based on this result, the first instrument used here is inventory size,
measured by the number of goods that the seller lists for sale during the sample period
for those albums in the sample. The second instrument is the heterogeneity of a seller’s
inventory. Zeithammer and Liu (2006) show that a seller with a heterogeneous inventory
prefers the auction mechanism. I measure inventory heterogeneity with a Herfindahl-type
index, defined as the sum of the squares of the share of each CD in the seller’s inventory. A
completely homogeneous inventory would take an index value of 1, while an inventory with
7In addition to the econometric argument I offer, see Livingston (2005) for a theoretical argument for the
appropriateness of the sample-selection model to handle the selling price of unsold items.
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equal numbers of each of the 49 CDs in the sample would take an index value of 0.204.
From the theoretical insights of these two papers, we should expect inventory size
and heterogeneity to be sufficiently correlated with a seller’ mechanism choice. Further,
Table 1 provides evidence that these two measures are systematically related to mechanism
and site. The next step in establishing the appropriateness of these two instruments is to
argue that they have no direct impact on the outcomes of interest. Importantly, the char-
acteristics of a seller’s inventory are not observed by buyers. Also, inventory characteristics
are unlikely to be correlated with other seller characteristics that are observed and valued
by buyers.
Regression Procedures
Before presenting the results, I detail the estimation technique for each outcome
of interest. Each model is estimated by maximum simulated likelihood because each system
of equations has two (potentially) endogenous binary regressors. Roodman (2007) details
the use of the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane simulator to evaluate the multivariate normal
integrals in the simulated likelihood functions.
1. Revenue is a corner-solution outcome variable equal to the selling price plus shipping
minus fees for sold items and the (negative of) the listing fee for unsold items. I use
a censored-regression model with idiosyncratic censoring because fees (the censoring
point) vary across observations.
2. The selling price plus shipping minus fees is a continuous outcome variable; I take
the log because it takes only non-negative values. Section I.5.1 described the sample-
selection model that deals with unsold items.
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3. The probability of sale is a binary outcome variable. Cappellari and Jenkins (2003)
discuss implementation of a probit maximum simulated likelihood model in Stata and
document the advantages of simulation methods in similar cases.
Results
Revenue
First, I compare the expected revenue of each mechanism in Table 3. I address the
potential endogeneity of the mechanism and site using instrumental variables in columns (2)
and (4). Diagnostic tests lead me to reject the null of exogeneity (F=127.72; p-value=0.00).8
The results suggest that auctioned goods earn lower revenue but the magnitudes of the
differences are small. Taking column (2) as the more appropriate specification, I cannot
reject revenue equivalence. Rerunning the analysis with only eBay items provides similar
results. Instead of dissecting these results and those from the remaining regressors, I analyze
separately the two components of revenue: selling price and probability of sale. Analyzing
price and sale probability individually has several advantages over revenue alone. First,
unsold items can be relisted and sold in a future period but the present formulation of
revenue is static in nature. Second, the risk preferences of sellers are unobserved and setting
revenue equal to price times the probability of sale arbitrarily assumes risk neutrality. The
remainder of this section analyzes each component of revenue separately.
8The Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank statistic rejects the null of an underidentified model (χ2=4.53, p-
value=0.03), providing some evidence that the instruments are sufficiently correlated with the endogenous
variables.
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Table 3. Regression Results for Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Items eBay Items Only
Control for Endogeneity? No Yes No Yes
Auction Dummy -0.443 -0.623 -0.371 -0.270
(0.119)** (0.501) (0.119)** (0.283)
eBay Dummy 0.431 2.919
(0.165)** (0.680)**
New CD 1.473 0.815 1.320 1.354
(0.124)** (0.183)** (0.138)** (0.139)**
Log(Seller’s Score) 0.226 0.180 0.231 0.236
(0.022)** (0.035)** (0.026)** (0.031)**
Seller’s Rating 7.373 9.897 9.876 9.893
(2.054)** (2.944)** (2.779)** (2.759)**
Scratched CD -1.026 -1.032 -0.922 -0.924
(0.301)** (0.371)** (0.392)* (0.397)*
No Description -0.250 -0.449 -0.337 -0.333
(0.158) (0.220)* (0.217) (0.218)
Promotional CD -0.681 -0.138 -0.612 -0.630
(0.184)** (0.203) (0.215)** (0.224)**
Case Damaged -0.505 0.207 -0.801 -0.810
(0.343) (0.441) (0.432) (0.431)
Case Missing -1.541 -1.460 -0.934 -0.928
(0.331)** (0.389)** (0.396)* (0.395)*
Observations 5,009 5,009 2,826 2,826
Notes: The dependent variable is equal to the selling price plus shipping minus fees for
sold items and the (negative of) the listing fee for unsold items. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses. * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Fixed effects for each album are including in all regressions; their coefficients, along with
the constant term, are suppressed.
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Selling Price
Results for the selling price estimation are in Tables 4 and 5. The notes to Table 5
detail the calculation of the marginal effects. As discussed in Section I.5.1, I use a sample-
selection model to correct for the bias from observing the prices of only sold items. As
with revenue, diagnostic tests for endogeneity suggest that columns (2) and (4) are more
appropriate (χ2=16.91; p-value=0.00). Posted-price items sell at higher prices (conditional
on selling) irrespective of controlling for endogeneity or excluding Half.com items. From
column (2), auctioned items sell for prices that are, on average, $1.11 lower than posted-price
items. Given a mean selling price (plus shipping minus fees) of $10.74, this translates to
approximately 11% lower prices for auctioned items. Considering only eBay items, posted-
price selling still outperforms the auction mechanism with an estimated price differential of
$0.82, or 7% (relative to a mean price on eBay of $11.02).
Other findings indicate that eBay items fare better than those on Half.com. Intu-
itively, brand-new items fetch higher prices than used items. The reputation of the seller
matters; both the quantity (score) and quality (rating) have the predicted relationship with
a good’s selling price. Certain negative item attributes result in lower prices: scratches on
the surface of the disc and no description of the item’s condition. Finally, CDs without a
jewel case sell for lower prices but those with a damaged case do not.
Probability of Sale
Tables 6 and 7 show the regression results and marginal effects for a probit es-
timation of the probability of sale. Again, I reject the null of exogeneity (χ2=169.57;
p-value=0.00) but present both the exogenous and endogenous results. In columns (2) and
(4), the treatment effect of auctioning on the probability of sale is positive. The effect is
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Table 4. Regression Results for Selling Price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Items eBay Items Only
Control for Endogeneity? No Yes No Yes
Auction Dummy -0.042 -0.086 -0.032 -0.062
(0.011)** (0.026)** (0.011)** (0.010)**
eBay Dummy 0.145 0.067
(0.014)** (0.024)**
New CD 0.134 0.135 0.136 0.129
(0.011)** (0.011)** (0.012)** (0.012)**
Log(Seller’s Score) 0.020 0.017 0.024 0.022
(0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)**
Seller’s Rating 0.786 1.107 0.895 0.885
(0.220)** (0.244)** (0.290)** (0.296)**
Scratched CD -0.151 -0.155 -0.155 -0.139
(0.041)** (0.041)** (0.051)** (0.050)**
No Description -0.052 -0.072 -0.043 -0.043
(0.020)** (0.021)** (0.027) (0.027)
Promotional CD -0.011 -0.008 -0.032 -0.028
(0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Case Damaged -0.021 -0.028 -0.062 -0.057
(0.040) (0.039) (0.047) (0.045)
Case Missing -0.201 -0.211 -0.106 -0.109
(0.046)** (0.049)** (0.055) (0.054)*
Observations 5,009 5,009 2,826 2,826
Notes: The dependent variable is equal to the log of the price at which the item sold plus
shipping minus all fees paid by the seller.
Table 5. Marginal Effects for Selling Price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Items eBay Items Only
Control for Endogeneity? No Yes No Yes
Auction Dummy -0.542 -1.105 -0.423 -0.817
(0.141)** (0.336)** (0.138)** (0.138)**
eBay Dummy 1.774 0.866
(0.167)** (0.304)**
New CD 1.654 1.700 1.679 1.647
(0.131)** (0.136)** (0.149)** (0.151)**
Notes: For all marginal effects, continuous variables (seller’s score and rating) are
evaluated at their sample means, discrete variables at their sample modes. This implies
that the reference CD is a brand-new copy of Celtic Woman’s self-titled album sold by an
eBay posted-price seller with a score of 15,727.05 and a rating of 98.69%.
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Table 6. Regression Results for Sale Probability
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Items eBay Items Only
Control for Endogeneity? No Yes No Yes
Auction Dummy -0.064 0.102 0.054 1.373
(0.070) (0.098) (0.072) (0.146)**
eBay Dummy 1.513 1.628
(0.067)** (0.087)**
New CD -0.564 -0.545 -0.419 -0.141
(0.056)** (0.054)** (0.079)** (0.080)
Log(Seller’s Score) -0.027 -0.019 0.028 0.073
(0.010)** (0.010) (0.015) (0.015)**
Seller’s Rating 2.074 1.438 -0.956 -1.214
(0.670)** (0.741) (1.459) (1.332)
Scratched CD 0.007 0.019 -0.159 -0.178
(0.162) (0.155) (0.252) (0.240)
No Description -0.103 -0.060 -0.050 -0.019
(0.086) (0.085) (0.159) (0.144)
Promotional CD 0.284 0.267 0.073 -0.088
(0.106)** (0.100)** (0.138) (0.132)
Case Damaged 0.527 0.534 0.400 0.390
(0.263)* (0.239)* (0.507) (0.446)
Case Missing 0.121 0.144 0.056 0.166
(0.223) (0.217) (0.312) (0.357)
Observations 5,009 5,009 2,826 2,826
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the item sold.
3.5% in the entire sample and 48.5% using only eBay items. These results suggest that, while
auctioned goods sell for lower prices, auctioneers are compensated with a higher probability
of sale. By breaking revenue into a separate analysis of the selling price and probability of
sale, I am able to understand more fully why the two mechanisms earn similar revenues.
Turning to other regressors, eBay items and used items sell with a higher prob-
ability, both of which were apparent in the aggregate statistics. The relationship between
the probability of sale and the seller’s reputation is less clear than with the selling price
estimation. The quantity of reputation has a negative effect in the entire sample but a pos-
16
Table 7. Marginal Effects for Sale Probability
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Items eBay Items Only
Control for Endogeneity? No Yes No Yes
Auction Dummy -0.023 0.035 0.009 0.485
(0.025) (0.034) (0.012) (0.051)**
eBay Dummy 0.515 0.562
(0.020)** (0.029)**
New CD -0.192 -0.160 -0.068 -0.054
(0.018)** (0.018)** (0.012)** (0.031)
itive effect when considering only eBay items. Investigating this issue further, unreported
results point toward the following relationship. Sellers yet to establish a reputation sell less
often. Presumably, the initial returns to reputation are a premium for establishing a history
of delivering goods of the promised condition, thereby alleviating some of the uncertainty
in seller quality. Once a seller has established a reputation however, the returns to more
positive feedback are severely decreasing. In the case of Half.com items, these returns are
actually negative. Finally, for item-specific covariates, promotional items and items with
damaged cases sell more frequently but these results are likely due to the fact that these
items being offered with lower reserve/posted prices.
Explanations and Future Directions
In these data, posted-price goods sell for higher prices than auctioned goods, yet
auctioned goods are more likely to sell. Taken together, the revenues of the two mecha-
nisms cannot be statistically distinguished from one another. To understand these results,
it is necessary to understand what factors lead a seller to choose an auction versus the
posted-price mechanism. In this section, I test between three hypotheses concerning sellers’
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mechanism choices: (1) the size of a seller’s inventory, (2) the heterogeneity of a seller’s
inventory, and (3) buyer impatience.
The importance of a seller’s inventory is shown by Harris and Raviv (1981) and
Zeithammer and Liu (2006). To see why buyer impatience may be related to the posted-
price premium, recall that a listing ends immediately when a willing buyer purchases a
posted-price good, while a bidder must wait for an auctioned good to end, no matter how
high the bid. Given this, one might expect that some buyers are willing to pay a premium for
a posted-price good in order to receive the good more quickly. I proxy for buyer impatience
with the release year of the album, arguing that buyers of recently-released albums should
exhibit more impatience than buyers of older albums.
I test between these hypotheses by estimating a probit model with a dependent
variable equal to one if the seller listed their item in an auction, zero if the seller listed their
item at a posted price. The results are in Table 8 and provide the most support for the
inventory-size hypothesis. Specifically, sellers with large inventories are more likely to post
a fixed price. In contrast to the inventory-heterogeneity hypothesis, I find that sellers with
heterogeneous inventories are less likely to use the auction mechanism. Using the sample
of only eBay items however, sellers with more heterogeneous inventories are no more or less
likely to sell in an auction. In contrast to the buyer-impatience hypothesis, the regression
suggests that recently-released albums are more likely to be auctioned in the entire sample.
There is support for the claim that sellers facing impatient buyers are more likely to sell in
an auction using only eBay items however.
These results suggest that the coexistence of the auction and posted-price markets
that I find can be rationalized by the size of a seller’s inventory. In particular, sellers
with large inventories are more likely to post a fixed price. I do not find that sellers with
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Table 8. Regression Results for Mechanism Choice
(1) (2)
All Items eBay Items Only
Seller’s Inventory Size -0.008 -0.012
(0.002)** (0.003)**
Seller’s Inventory Homogeneity 0.722 -0.035
(0.077)** (0.113)
Recently-Released Album 0.522 -0.517
(0.113)** (0.186)**
New CD -0.167 -0.571
(0.049)** (0.069)**
Log(Seller’s Score) 0.001 -0.094
(0.011) (0.015)**
Seller’s Rating 3.410 0.682
(0.838)** (0.969)
Scratched CD -0.047 0.540
(0.140) (0.333)
No Description -0.387 -0.048
(0.078)** (0.138)
Promotional CD 0.122 0.418
(0.087) (0.130)**
Case Damaged -0.210 0.035
(0.202) (0.302)
Case Missing -0.154 -0.207
(0.192) (0.341)
Observations 5,009 2,826
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the item was listed for
sale in an auction.
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heterogeneous inventories are more likely to sell in an auction. I also do not find consistent
evidence that recently-released albums are more likely to sell at a posted price but there
is some support for the buyer-impatience hypothesis in the sample of only eBay items.
These results confirm the insights of Harris and Raviv (1981) and suggest that sellers think
carefully about their capacity constraints when selling goods in an environment, such as an
online marketplace, that features both the auction and posted-price mechanisms.
Appendix - Regressors
Define the following four variables: Y ∗1 = Selling Price (plus shipping minus fees),
Y2 = Sale Dummy (equal to one if the item sold), Y3 = Auction Dummy (equal to one
for auctioned items), and finally Y4 = eBay Dummy (equal to one if the item was listed
at eBay). X1 and X2 are vectors of covariates believed to influence the selling price and
probability of sale, respectively. Consider the following specification:
Y ∗1 = X1β1 + γ1Y3 + γ2Y4 + ε1
Y1 = Y ∗1 if Y2 = 1
Y2 = 1(X2β2 + γ3Y3 + γ4Y4 + ε2 > 0)
Y3 = 1(Xβ3 + ε3 > 0)
Y4 = 1(Xβ4 + ε4 > 0)
where 1(·) is the indicator function. The key parameters of interest measure the treatment
effect of auctioning on the selling price (γ1) and probability of sale (γ3). The regressors in
X1 and X2 control for seller-specific and item-specific heterogeneity.
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X1: Seller Reputation:
eBay and Half.com share a common feedback system, which serves as a reputation
mechanism. Following completion of a transaction, both the buyer and the seller have the
opportunity to leave a feedback report the other party (with reports being positive, neutral,
or negative). A user receiving feedback for a transaction on one site has it combined with
her total feedback, which includes all transactions from both sites. I measure reputation
with the following two variables:
• Log(Seller’s Score) - the log of the seller’s feedback score plus one. The score is
defined by eBay as the number of positive feedback reports minus the number of
negative reports.
• Seller’s Rating - the number of positive reports divided by the total number of reports.
X1: Item-Specific Characteristics:
• New Item - item is still sealed in the original packaging.
• Scratched - the surface of the CD is scratched, scuffed, or marked in some way.
• No Description - item listed without description of its condition.
• Promotional - item is not a retail version of the album. Promotional copies are sent
to media outlets by the record label for review purposes prior to the released of the
album.
• Case Damaged - jewel case is cracked or otherwise damaged.
• Case Missing - jewel case is missing (only the disc is being offered for sale).
• Compact Disc - fixed effects for each album in the sample.
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X2 includes all of the covariates in X1 in addition to the following:
• Start Price - the minimum bid (for auctions) or the posted price at which unsold
items did not sell (for posted-price goods). This is included in the Heckman selection
equation (as an exclusive restriction to identify the selection bias) but not in the sale
probability estimation.
X includes all of the covariates in X1 in addition to the following:
• Seller’s Inventory Size - number of albums in the sample that the seller lists for sale
during the sample period. The sample is split at its median into large inventories
(greater than or equal to three goods) and small inventories (less than three goods).
• Seller’s Inventory Homogeneity - fraction of a seller’s inventory that is a different
album than the album of the current item. Inventories are categorizes as homoge-
neous (all goods are for the same album) or heterogeneous (more than one album is
represented).
Additional Variable
• Album Release Year - calendar year in which the album was released. Albums are
categorized as recently released when released since 2005 but the results are checked
with the alternative definition of released since 2004.
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CHAPTER II
A Structural Model of Competing Sellers: Auctions and Posted Prices
In an original data set of goods listed for sale online, I observe that multiple selling mechanisms are
popular with buyers and sellers in the compact-disc market. I construct a model to explain how
heterogeneous sellers choose between selling in an auction and posting a fixed price. An important
contribution of this work is that I model competing sellers instead of a monopolist. In doing so,
I show that accounting for the competitive structure of the marketplace is vital in explaining the
coexistence of mechanisms. In the model, the value of each seller’s outside option is identified using
an optimality condition from the seller’s pricing problem. The main result of the paper is that sellers
with more valuable outside options choose to post a fixed price. On the demand side, my approach
for estimating the unobserved number of potential buyers compares favorably to an approach that
assumes there are infinitely many buyers. The findings are consistent with a highly competitive
market that is more closely approximated by perfect competition than monopoly.
Introduction
Why do we observe goods offered for sale simultaneously using different selling
mechanisms? In an original data set of online compact disc sales, I observe some sellers
auctioning their goods and other sellers choosing to post a fixed price. Numerous papers
in the mechanism-design literature show that a seller earns higher expected revenue when
selling in an auction. In fact, one can more easily list the papers that do not find the
auction to be optimal; I review several such papers in the next section. Given the wealth
of theoretical evidence in favor of the auction mechanism, it is puzzling why any seller with
the option to sell in an auction would post a fixed price.
I approach the apparent puzzle of mechanism coexistence in the context of a struc-
tural model of competing sellers and find that seller heterogeneity explains the structure of
this market. Specifically, sellers with more valuable outside options choose to post a fixed
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price. This result contrasts with explanations of mechanism coexistence that are based
on differences across buyers. Two such explanations do not hold in these data: (1) the
posted-price mechanism does not attract more buyers than the auction mechanism and (2)
posted-price buyers do not have higher values.
An alternative approach in explaining coexistence is to show that, within the
context of a particular model, a monopolist prefers an auction under certain conditions
and the posted-price mechanism under other conditions. The conclusion one might draw
is that the coexistence of mechanisms in a competitive environment can be explained by
some sellers meeting the conditions that make auctions optimal and other sellers meeting
the conditions that make posted-price selling optimal. While such an exercise is useful in
pointing out the relative merits of each mechanism, it is not always clear how the insights
from monopoly models extend to a competitive environment.
Given that I consider competing sellers, it is increasingly difficult to answer the
question of coexistence without first developing a theoretical framework. Accordingly,
I develop a new structural model where sellers enter either the auction or posted-price
mechanism. The structural approach has become increasingly common in the empirical
analysis of auction data, beginning with Paarsch (1992) and first used in the context of online
auctions by Bajari and Hortasu (2003). In my setting, a structural model is especially useful
in isolating the determinants of coexistence because of the increased strategic interactions
that are present when considering multiple sellers.
Several features of the online music compact-disc (CD) market motivate the the-
oretical model. First, this market is likely to be competitive, if only due to the fact that
these goods are available at a number of retail outlets, such as Wal-Mart or Circuit City.
Second, the ratio of potential buyers to sellers is lower than in many other markets on
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eBay. If the number of potential buyers per seller is large, it may be appropriate to ignore
the strategic interactions between sellers. However, when sellers compete for a relatively
small pool of buyers, it is essential to account for the competitive structure of the market-
place. Third, it is likely that the demand for CDs is driven by idiosyncratic tastes and
preferences, consistent with an independent-private-values model in which buyers’ values
are i.i.d. random variables. I introduce the model after discussing related papers from the
literature.
Monopoly Comparisons Between Mechanisms
In a number of different settings, a seller maximizes her expected revenue by
offering an auction. Under different assumptions however, an auction is no longer optimal
and can be inferior to other common mechanisms such as posted-price selling. In particular,
posting a fixed price is optimal if the monopolist’s capacity exceeds potential demand (Harris
and Raviv 1981), while the posted price mechanism revenue dominates auctions (but is not
itself optimal) when buyers’ values are highly interdependent (Campbell and Levin 2006).
Wang (1993) argues that a monopolist prefers posted-price selling when buyers’ values are
not too dispersed. In his model, an auction costs the seller a marginal cost (for storage)
and a fixed cost incurred once per auction, while the posted-price mechanism costs the
seller only a marginal cost (for displaying). Building on Wang’s model, Zeithammer and
Liu (2006) show that a monopolist with a homogeneous inventory is more likely to post a
fixed price.
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Competing Mechanism Designers
While the monopoly assumption is common in the study of mechanism design,
several papers consider multiple sellers who compete for a fixed pool of buyers. The
literature on competing mechanism designers shows that, as was seen in the context of
a monopolist, the auction mechanism revenue dominates the posted-price mechanism in
many settings. McAfee (1993) finds that when sellers can offer any direct mechanism (see
Myerson (1981) for a definition), auctions are optimal. Peters (1997) extends this result
to sellers with heterogeneous values. Like McAfee (1993) and Peters (1997), I assume that
a buyer knows his value when choosing between sellers. In contrast, other papers assume
that a buyer does not know his value when choosing between sellers. Of these, Damianov
(2008) finds that equilibrium mechanisms are payoff equivalent to second-price auctions,
while Peters (1994) finds that the posted-price mechanism is optimal in a model where
sellers communicate with buyers sequentially.
Coexistence
Ellison et al. (2004) address the issue of coexistence in the context of competing
auction houses instead of competing auctioneers. The authors show that, while two auction
houses can coexist, a monopolistic auction house is always an equilibrium. Another set of
related papers consider directed search, where all buyers are homogeneous and all sellers are
homogeneous. In Coles and Eeckhout (2003), there exists a continuum of equilibria that do
not uniquely tie down the payoffs to buyers and sellers. The all posted-price equilibrium
and the all auction equilibrium both exist, though sellers prefer the latter. In a model
with two buyers and two sellers, Julien et al. (2001) find that whether coexistence is an
equilibrium depends on the model’s timing assumptions. Specifically, when sellers choose
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mechanisms first and prices second, only the auction-auction equilibrium is subgame perfect.
Coexistence is an equilibrium when mechanisms and prices are chosen simultaneously.
The Timing of Moves
Buyers are subscripted by i ∈ [1, ..., N ], sellers by j ∈ [1, ...,M ], and mechanisms
by k ∈ {A,P}.1 Let N = NA +NP and M = MA +MP . The timing is as follows:
Stage 0 Sellers observe their costs for each mechanism and the value of their outside option.
Stage 1 Buyers and sellers simultaneously enter either the auction or posted-price market.
Stage 2 Sellers simultaneously set prices.
Stage 3 All players observe the number of buyers and sellers who entered each mechanism as
well as the prices and characteristics of all sellers. Buyers observe their values.
Stage 4 Buyers simultaneously choose between the sellers in their chosen mechanism and all
players observe the number of buyers who chose each seller.
Stage 5 Buyers choose an action and each mechanism proceeds according to its rules.
I assume that all market participants are risk neutral. All decisions (choice of
mechanism, choice of seller, etc.) are irreversible and I consider a one-shot game where
unfulfilled demand remains unfulfilled and all sellers who do not sell retain their good.
Sellers
M sellers are endowed with a single, indivisible unit of a good that can be sold in an
auction or at a posted price. I focus on a second-price auction, where the buyer submitting
1I use the terminology buyers and sellers though some buyers may not purchase a good and some sellers’
goods may not sell. In the auction literature, my notion of buyers corresponds to potential bidders.
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the highest bid obtains the good at a price equal to the maximum of the (public) reserve
price and the second-highest bid. In the initial discussion, I abstract from several details
of an eBay-style auction; these are discussed in Section II.3. If the seller posts a fixed
price, the good is sold to a willing buyer at the posted price. Buyers in the posted-price
mechanism indicate their willingness to purchase at the posted price simultaneously. If
multiple buyers indicate a willingness to buy a posted-price seller’s good, I assume that the
seller chooses each with an equal probability.
I use a random-utility-maximization model to analyze the sellers’ mechanism-
choice problem. In these models, agents have heterogeneous preferences over a discrete
set of choices. Preferences consist of a systematic component and a random component,
both of which are observed by the agent. An outside observer, however, never observes the
random component, implying that utility is random from the perspective of the econome-
trician (McFadden 1974; Manski 1977). In my setting, sellers choose between the auction
and posted-price mechanisms by comparing their expected profit from each, where the
profit of seller j in mechanism k is pijk. The systematic component of pijk is the expected
revenue from each mechanism, E(Revjk), which includes v0jk, their payoff from an unsold
good. I refer to v0jk as the value of the seller’s outside option. It could be her per-
sonal consumption value or the value of selling in another market. Under risk neutrality,
E(Revjk) = Pr(Salejk) · E(Pricejk) + (1− Pr(Salejk)) · v0jk.
The random component of profits takes the form of an additive, mechanism-specific
shock, ωjk. The shocks are each seller’s private information and are unobserved by the
econometrician. There are numerous reasons why a seller may have idiosyncratic prefer-
ences for a mechanism outside of its price or probability of sale. The introduction outlined
a number of papers that provide conditions under which an auction revenue dominates
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the posted-price mechanism. Papers that compare mechanisms in a monopoly framework
indicate that, if sellers are heterogeneous along one of several dimensions, different sellers
may prefer different mechanisms. Sellers may have heterogeneous inventories (Harris and
Raviv 1981; Zeithammer and Liu 2006); degrees of impatience (Ziegler and Lazear 2003);
or degrees of risk aversion (Mathews and Katzman 2006).
To fix ideas, I focus on a single explanation (outside of expected revenue concerns)
for why sellers have idiosyncratic preferences over mechanisms. Namely, I assume that
the auction and posted-price mechanisms entail different costs for different sellers.2 If I
define ωjk as seller j’s cost of selling in mechanism k, the seller’s expected profit from each
mechanism is: pijk = E(Revjk) − ωjk. Using this, define pij as the seller’s net expected
profit from offering an auction and assume the ωjk’s are i.i.d. draws from a distribution
with cdf Gk(·): pij = E(RevjA) − E(RevjP ) − ωj , where ωj = ωjA − ωjP . Under my
interpretation of the random component of sellers’ profits, ωj is how much more costly it
is for seller j to sell in an auction rather than at a posted price. The ωjk terms could
then be the cost of finding the optimal price for a given mechanism. Because setting a
reserve price is quite different from setting a posted price, it seems reasonable that these
costs are heterogeneous across sellers. Within this structure, I can generate any outcome
in the sellers’ mechanism-choice subgame including all sellers auctioning, all sellers posting
a fixed price, and most importantly, the coexistence of mechanisms.
If the factors mentioned above play a role in the mechanism-choice problem, they
can be captured by the ωjk terms as well. In the case of risk aversion, the cost terms can be
interpreted as a risk premium. In the case of impatience, they can be interpreted as the cost
of waiting for an auction to end (since posted-price listings end immediately upon purchase).
2It is useful to highlight the distinction between a seller’s outside option and her cost. The value of a
seller’s outside option is her payoff if the item does not sell, while a seller’s cost is the amount incurred upon
entering a particular mechanism, irrespective of whether the good sells.
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If either was the sole reason why different sellers entered different mechanisms, then the
correct approach would be to model sellers as heterogeneous in either their coefficients of
risk aversion or their discount rates. The model could then be used to find the value of
these parameters such that all seller more risk averse or more impatient than the cutoff
value posted a fixed price. My view, however, is that the data available from eBay are
not sufficient to distinguish between the numerous competing explanations. As a result, I
model all factors outside of expected revenue concerns in an additive, mechanism-specific
shock and refer to these shocks as costs.
Buyers
Buyers’ Mechanism Choice
N buyers each demand at most one unit to be purchased in an auction or at a
posted price.3 Buyers who do not purchase receive a payoff that is normalized to zero.
Buyers enter mechanisms before observing their values or the numbers of buyers and sellers
who entered each mechanism. Define Fk(·) as the distribution of the values of buyers in
mechanism k; fk(·) its corresponding density; ρB ∈ [0, 1] and ρS ∈ [0, 1] as the share of
buyers and sellers, respectively, who enter the auction mechanism; and qjk ∈ [0, 1] as the
share of buyers in mechanism k who choose seller j.4
Expected utility for a buyer who enters the auction mechanism is E(UA) =
3In the data, 3.8% of goods were purchased by a buyer who I observe purchasing another unit. I ignore
the possibility of multi-unit demand throughout because the assumption of unit demand seems appropriate
for CDs. Buyers who demand multiple units can be thought of as drawing multiple, independent values.
4The word “share” implies that participants use pure strategies but buyers use a mixed strategy when
entering a mechanism. Accordingly, ρB is the symmetric probability with which buyers enter the auction
mechanism.
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∑MA
j=1 (qjA · E(UjA)). Expected utility from a given auctioneer j is:
E(UjA) =
N∑
NA=1
(
N
NA
)
ρNAB (1− ρB)N−NA
NA−1∑
nj−1=0
(
NA − 1
nj − 1
)
q
nj−1
jA (1− qjA)NA−nj
· (
∫ ∞
rj
(1− FA(v))FA(v)nj−1dv).
The summation over NA governs the number of buyers who enter the auction mechanism,
while the summation over nj − 1 governs the number of buyers who choose auctioneer j
(other than buyer i, from whose point of view the expected utility is taken). Similarly:
E(UjP ) =
N∑
NP=1
(
N
NP
)
(1− ρB)NP ρBN−NP
NP−1∑
nj−1=0
(
NP − 1
nj − 1
)
q
nj−1
jP (1− qjP )NP−nj
· 1
nj
(
∫ ∞
pj
vfP (v)dv − (1− FP (pj))pj).
Buyers’ Choice Among Sellers
Having entered mechanism k, buyers observe the number of buyers and sellers
in each mechanism along with the prices and characteristics of all sellers. Each buyer
chooses the seller in mechanism k who offers him the highest utility, where utility has a
systematic component and a random component. Prior to choosing between sellers, buyers
observe both components of their utility function, while the econometrician never observes
the random component. The utility function of buyer i who chooses seller j in mechanism
k has the following components: the utility from seller j’s good, vijk; the utility from a good
with certain observable characteristics, Xj ; and the disutility from the expected payment,
τjk, to seller j. That is, Uijk = vijk + Xjθk − τjk. The idiosyncratic value, vijk, is a
match-specific scalar, drawn from Fk (·). Xj is of dimension 1 × h, while θk is an h × 1
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vector of parameters that governs how buyers value the observable covariates.
To complete the parameterization of the model, I need to handle the expected
payment, τjk, which (under risk neutrality) is the product of the expected probability of
receiving seller j’s good and the expected price. Consider each mechanism in turn. For
the posted-price mechanism, the story is similar to the typical discrete-choice framework
(McFadden 1974) but there is an important difference. In my setting, a buyer who selects
posted-price seller j may be one of several buyers who selected this seller. Since the seller
has only one good, buyers who choose between sellers must not only consider the price but
also the probability with which they expect to obtain the good. Instead of fully modeling
how buyers form these expectations, I take a reduced-form approach and posit that buyers
view the expected payment as a simple function of the posted price: τjP = pjαP . For the
auction mechanism, I assume that buyers take the expected auction payment to be a simple
function of its clearest available signal, the reserve price: τjA = rjαA.
As is common (e.g., Berry (1994)), buyers have an outside option, labeled seller 0,
from whom they receive Ui0k = vi0k.5 Buyers draw a value for the outside seller from the
same distribution that they draw values for the inside sellers. The remaining components
of the utility that buyer i receives from seller 0 are normalized to zero, implying that the
Xj and τjk components for the inside sellers should be viewed as differences between seller
j and the outside seller.
Trade
After choosing a particular seller, buyers consider their consumption value from
the good, Vijk, when formulating a strategy. In particular, buyers choose an action (what
5Buying from the outside seller can be thought of as exiting the market after choosing a particular
mechanism. This may occur when a buyer’s value is below the lowest (reserve or posted) price.
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to bid in an auction; whether or not to buy in the posted-price mechanism) based on the
following specification: Vijk = vijk + Zjβk. Before proceeding, I make two notational
points. First, while observable characteristics enter the value specification as they entered
the utility function, I use Zjβk in the value specification to allow for the possibility that
different characteristics influence a buyer’s utility (i.e., his choice of seller) than influence a
buyer’s value (i.e., his bid/buy strategy). Second, I refer to Vijk as a buyer’s consumption
value and vijk as a buyer’s idiosyncratic value. Since sellers are endowed with one unit of a
good with given characteristics, the seller cares about the distribution of Vijk because this
is the distribution that enters the expression for the expected revenue. In particular, in
the auction case, a buyer who is said to bid truthfully (as buyers do in the equilibrium of
second-price auctions) bids VijA.
Because the choices of mechanism and seller are irreversible, buyers formulated
their strategies in the trade stage in a similar way to buyers who face a monopolist.6 I
discuss the remaining details regarding buyers’ strategies after introducing the details of an
eBay-style auction, as these rules determine the modeling and estimation approach that I
use.
Compact Disc Sales on eBay
On eBay, sellers choose two prices: a (public) reserve price and a Buy-it-Now
(BIN) price.7 The reserve price is also known as the minimum bid; bids below this price
are not accepted. The BIN price allows buyers the opportunity to circumvent the auction
6In contrast, Lee and Malmendier (2008) assume that losing bidders can purchase immediately at the
posted price, implying an upper bound on rational bids. Their empirical results, however, indicate that
buyers do bid above the prevailing posted price in what they deem “over-bidding.”
7I ignore secret reserve price because they are rarely used by the sellers in this market.
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process and win the good immediately. If the BIN price is set to infinity, the mechanism is
said to be an auction. If the BIN price is set equal to the reserve price, the mechanism is
said to be a posted price. Sellers may also set a finite BIN price that is above the reserve
price, in what is known as a BIN auction. To maintain focus on common mechanisms that
are available in a variety of on and oﬄine settings, I ignore BIN auctions and consider only
pure auctions and pure posted prices.8 All prices are inclusive of shipping, which is set by
the seller and ranges from $0 to $16 in these data.9
Buyers who search for a particular good can view all open listings in either mecha-
nism. The number of days that items are listed is chosen by the seller to be either 1, 3, 5, 7,
or 10 days and buyers can place a bid or accept the posted price at any point before the
listing closes. The rules of an eBay auction resemble those of a second-price, ascending
(English) auction. The buyer placing the highest bid obtains the good at the price equal
to the maximum of the reserve price and the second-highest bid. eBay uses proxy bidding,
where the computer accepts a buyer’s bid and incrementally raises the standing bid such
that it is equal to the second-highest of the bids already placed. The buyer placing the
highest of the bids already placed is listed as the current high bidder. If a seller chooses to
sell at a posted price (i.e., sets the BIN price equal to the reserve price), the listing closes
and the good is sold to the first buyer who selects the “Buy-It-Now” option. If a listing
closes without attracting a buyer, the good is unsold and is retained by the seller.
The sample from the current paper contains 21 albums. These albums were drawn
from a larger sample used in previous work. The albums in the older sample were randomly
8BIN auctions are analyzed in Ackerberg et al. (2006), Anderson et al. (2004), and Zeithammer and Liu
(2006).
9The script that collected the data reported shipping as missing in 826 cases (12.6% of all auction
observations and 9.7% of all posted-price observations). I impute shipping for these observations with the
Stata package ice. Imputation is preferred to the alternatives such as mean-plugging or casewise deletion
(Little and Rubin 2002). The imputation model is available upon request.
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Table 9. Number of Goods
Auction Posted-Price
Condition Market Market All
New 3,788 1,703 5,491
Used 1,106 302 1,408
All 4,894 2,005 6,899
Notes: The number of goods listed for sale in each market is shown by condition of the
good. I drop 163 observations that correspond to {CD,week, condition} groups for which
either the auction or posted-price market was inactive (i.e., Mk = 0).
selected, half of which were restricted to being recently released. The current sample uses
only those albums listed more than 100 times in the older data set. I collected all listings
for these 21 albums from February 5 to March 22, 2006. See Table 9 for a breakdown
of the number of goods across mechanisms and condition of the good (new or used). For
sellers, I model the eBay market as being generated from M sellers each offering one good
for sale. In actuality, the data set contains 6, 899 goods sold by 1, 859 sellers. I ignore this
distinction and assume that the observations of multiple-listing sellers are independent.10
For buyers, the biggest complication with the observed data is that the number
of potential buyers who enter either mechanism is unobserved. In an eBay auction, the
difficulty in observing the number of potential buyers is due to the truncation problem
discussed in Song (2004). As she describes, the number of buyers who bid on a particular
auction is only a lower bound on the number of buyers who chose that seller because only
bids above the current standing bid are accepted. This implies a truncation of bidders
whose bids would have been placed but were not because the standing bid was above their
10An important next step is to consider the intermediate case between the common approach of one seller
with M goods and my approach of M sellers each with one good. Moldovanu et al. (2007) model competing
sellers with endogenously-determined capacities but their sellers may only sell in an auction.
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willingness-to-pay at the time they attempted to bid. For the posted-price mechanism,
it is extremely common for the researcher not to observe the number of potential buyers
because data from posted-price markets almost always shows in which mechanisms buyers
are purchasing, not in which mechanisms buyers are entering. I discuss my approach for
estimating NA and NP in Section II.4.2.1.
I group observations into {CD,week, condition,mechanism} tuples. In doing so,
I argue that a buyer makes his purchase decision by considering all sellers who have listed
a given CD of a given condition in a given week. Any time frame chosen is somewhat
arbitrary but the results are robust to alternative time frames and it seems reasonable that
buyers may “shop around” for one week. Concerning the condition of the good, new or
used, I argue that there are separate populations of buyers for new and used goods. It
is more likely that some buyers of new goods may consider buying a used good and vice
versa. Without knowing these preferences however, it is unclear what fraction of buyers
would have been willing to purchase a good of the other condition. I now introduce the
estimation strategy.
A Structural Model
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Sellers
Sellers’ Mechanism Choice
Define Aj as a dummy variable equal to one if seller j offers an auction and equal
to zero if seller j posts a fixed price. The econometric specification is:
Pr(Aj = 1) = Pr(E(RevjA)− E(RevjP )− ωj > 0).
This is standard for the most part but my objective is different than the usual case. I
am not interested in the effect of some vector of covariates on the outcome variable, Aj .
Instead, since costs are unobserved by the econometrician, I use the above equation to infer
sellers’ costs from their mechanism choices. Specifically, I assume that, conditional on
E(RevA) and E(RevP ), ωjk follows a Gumbel distribution, Gk(·).11 I assume that the
two cost distributions have the same scale, σ, but different location parameters, µk. As a
result, ωj = ωjA−ωjP follows a logistic distribution with parameters µ = µA−µP and σ:
Pr(Aj = 1) = Pr(
ωj − µ
σ
<
E(RevjA)− E(RevjP )− µ
σ
). (II.1)
Using the formulations for the expected revenues (found in Appendix II.7), I con-
struct a new variable equal to E(RevjA)−E(RevjP ). I can then estimate the parameters
µ and σ in a logit maximum-likelihood regression of Aj (the auction dummy for seller j) on
E(RevjA)−E(RevjP ), which is now data. The scale parameter for each cost distribution,
Gk(·), is σ and the difference between the two location parameters is µ = µA − µP . While
11A random variable x that follows a Gumbel distribution with parameters µ (location) and σ (scale) has
cdf F (x) = exp(− exp(−x−µ
σ
)) and pdf f(x) = 1
σ
exp(−x−µ
σ
) exp(− exp(−x−µ
σ
)). The Gumbel distribution
is also known as the extreme value type I distribution or the double exponential distribution.
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the individual location parameters, µA and µP , are not identified, µ indicates how the cen-
ters of the two distributions differ.12 The parameter µ is meaningful because the difference
between ωjA and ωjP determines which mechanism a seller enters. The magnitude of the
ωjk terms only affects whether the seller enters one of the mechanisms or exits the market,
and my data are limited to those sellers who entered a mechanism. Finally, it is worth
pointing out the simplicity of this estimation approach as the structural parameters can be
recovered in a simple, univariate logit regression.
Pricing
Based on my timing assumptions, sellers do not observe the number of buyers
or other sellers in each mechanism before pricing but are aware of their costs and outside
options. Given the nature of the costs in this paper, they are irrelevant (i.e., sunk) when
sellers are selecting a price. The value of the seller’s outside option, however, does matter.
This highlights the distinction pointed out in footnote 2 between the two concepts. If
sellers set the optimal price by maximizing the expected revenue of their chosen mechanism
(equation (A1) or (A2) in Appendix II.7), I can infer each seller’s outside option from her
pricing decision. This implies that the distribution of outside options, H
(
v0
)
, is identified
without any assumption on its parametric form.
There are two ways to measure the intensity of price competition in this model:
using the estimates of αk or using prices. (Recall that αk is the coefficient on the (reserve
or posted) price in a buyer’s utility function.) If αk = 0, then prices have no influence
on the way in which buyers select sellers. Inferring competitiveness from the αk terms
is advantageous because it does not require strong assumptions on sellers’ pricing behav-
12The mode of a Gumbel distribution is µ. The mean is µ+0.57721σ, where 0.57721 is the Euler constant.
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ior. Alternatively, I can measure competitiveness directly from prices. For the auction,
Appendix II.7 shows that seller j’s price will lie in the interval [v0jA, r
M
j ], where r
M
j solves
rMj = v
0
jA +
1−FA(rMj )
fA(r
M
j )
and is seller j’s optimal reserve price when αA = 0. I construct a
Lerner-type index equal to
rj−v0jA
rj
, interpreted as the mark-up that a seller charges above
her outside option. For the posted-price mechanism, seller j will never post a price below
v0jP but there is no upper bound analogous to the auction case, as described in Appendix
II.7. I measure the intensity of posted-price competition with
pj−v0jP
pj
.
Buyers
Buyers’ Mechanism Choice
As described in Section II.3, the number of buyers who entered each mechanism is
unobserved. Here I outline my approach for overcoming this problem in order to identify ρB,
the rate at which buyers mix between mechanisms.13 For the auction market, I set NA equal
to the number of buyers who placed any bid in any seller’s auction. This approximation
will be quite good when bidding costs are low (as they should be in an online setting) and
some sellers set a low reserve price (which would allow a buyer with a low value to place
a bid before the standing bid exceeds it). The grouping described in Section II.3 implies
that I estimate NA separately for each {CD,week, condition}.
Buyers enter the mechanism offering highest expected utility but do so before
observing their values. As a result, the two mechanisms can coexist only when they offer
buyers the same expected utility. This result is useful because it allows me to overcome
the common problem of not observing the number of buyers in a posted-price market.14 If
13In Appendix II.8.3, I estimate an alternative model with an infinite number of buyers in each mechanism.
The results indicate that my approach for estimating Nk provides a better fit for these data.
14Other solutions to this problem seem less appropriate in my case. Berry et al. (1995), for example,
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both mechanisms are active in equilibrium, the following equality must hold, where Fk(·) is
the distribution of buyers’ consumption values:
NA−1∑
n−1=0
(
NA − 1
n− 1
)
(
1
MA
)n−1(1− 1
MA
)NA−n · (
∫ ∞
r¯
(1− FA(v))FA(v)n−1dv)
=
NP−1∑
n−1=0
(
NP − 1
n− 1
)
(
1
MP
)n−1(1− 1
MP
)NP−n · 1
n
(
∫ ∞
p¯
vfP (v)dv − (1− FP (p¯))p¯).
(II.2)
Note that these differ from the expected utility terms outlined in Section II.2.2.1 in three
ways. First, I use the realized number of buyers who entered each mechanism instead of
the distributions of NA and NP . In essence, this is assuming that there is no aggregate
uncertainty. This means that, although buyers mix between mechanisms simultaneously,
buyers expect that the number of buyers in a mechanism will be equal to its average value
(i.e., NA = ρB · N and NP = (1 − ρB) · N). Second, buyers assume they will pay the
mean price in their chosen mechanism, r¯ or p¯, when they should take the expectation of the
decision rule (r(v0) or p(v0)) with respect to v0. This is again assuming that there is no
aggregate uncertainty. Third, I impose that, when buyers forecast their expected utility,
they expect all buyers to choose each seller with an equal probability (i.e., qk = 1Mk ). This
follows from the fact that each seller is expected to charge the mean price, r¯ or p¯. Under
these restrictions, equation (II.2) uniquely identifies NP .15
assume that the number of buyers of automobiles is equal to the number of households in the United States.
15More precisely, equation (II.2) uniquely identifies NP once the distribution FP (V ) is known but NP is
needed to recover FP (V ). I use priors for the distribution’s parameters, γP and δP , to solve for NˆP , use
this NˆP to solve for γˆP and δˆP , and iterate the process until it converges.
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Buyers’ Choice Among Sellers
After entering a particular mechanism, buyer i observes all components of his
utility function (Uijk = vijk +Xjθk− τjk ) and chooses the seller offering the highest utility.
Buyers draw their idiosyncratic values, vijk, conditional on Xj and τjk, from F vk (v), where
I use F vk (·) instead of the more precise F vk (·|X, τ). The distributional assumption for
buyers’ values plays a critical role in any parametric estimation of market data because it
determines what fraction of the buyers have a willingness-to-pay at or below a particular
price. Here though, the parametric form of F vk (·) plays a dual role in that it also determines
the structure of the shares, qjk.
Given that the vijk’s follow a Gumbel distribution, the share of buyers who choose
seller j has a multinomial-logit form:
qjk =
exp(Xjθk − τjk)
1 +
∑Mk
l=1 exp(Xlθk − τlk)
, (II.3)
where τjA = rjαA and τjP = pjαP . The outside seller’s share is:
q0k =
1
1 +
∑Mk
l=1 exp(Xlθk − τlk)
.
This makes it clear that the probabilities sum to one,
∑Mk
j=0 qjk = 1.
The Gumbel distribution works particularly well because it provides a simple form
for the qjk terms. It also does not impose symmetry, which is convenient given that there
is no a priori reason that values should follow a symmetric distribution. A major drawback
of the Gumbel distributional assumption is the well-known Independence from Irrelevant
Alternatives (IIA) property. IIA implies that, ∀ j, j′ ∈ Mk, the ratio qjkqj′k is unchanged
under the addition or subtraction of any third seller. This could be violated, for example,
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if the buyers who chose the seller with the lowest price would deviate to the seller with the
second-lowest price if the low-priced seller exited the market. I check for violations of the
IIA property in Appendix II.8.2.
An important assumption necessary for my estimation approach is that the vijk
terms are uncorrelated with not only Xj but also prices. In essence, I assume that there
are no unobserved seller or product characteristics and that all relevant factors are captured
by Xj . It is reasonable in my setting to ignore unobserved heterogeneity because, in an
online setting, all of the information that is available to buyers is also available to the
econometrician. Everything that buyers know about the seller and the good is viewable
on the eBay listing page. If buyers have outside information, either from e-mail contact or
previous purchase experience with the seller, then simultaneity may be a problem (Berry
1994). It is important to point out, however, that the common way to deal with unobserved
heterogeneity allows only product-level unobservables and would not control for different
buyers having different information. E-mail contact and previous purchase experience are
captured in vijk as long as this information is i.i.d. across buyers.16
Trade
After buyers have chosen a seller, the game is modeled following the literature
on incomplete auctions (Haile and Tamer 2003). To illustrate, first consider the auction
mechanism. In an incomplete model, the exact way that buyers formulate their bidding
strategies is left unspecified. Recall that buyers bid based on their consumption values:
VijA = vijA + ZjβA. I follow Haile and Tamer and assume that buyers: (1) place a bid
no larger than their consumption value, VijA, and (2) do not allow an opponent to win at
16The i.i.d. assumption imposes a private-values model, which I test in Appendix II.8.1.
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a price below VijA. In an eBay-style auction, the proxy bidding system insures that these
assumptions guarantee the two things needed for identification (Ackerberg et al. 2006;
Canals-Cerd and Pearcy 2006): (1) the buyer with the highest value wins the auction and
(2) the buyer with the second-highest value places a bid in the amount of his value. I
take an incomplete approach because the structural parameters of interest can be identified
without limiting the results to the context of a particular model of bidding.17 Generality
is important at this stage of the game because numerous bidding strategies are available to
buyers. The disadvantage of the incomplete approach is that only one bid per auction that
can be taken as truthful (since the highest bid is not observed in an English auction).
I place similar restrictions on the buyers in the posted-price mechanism: (1) do
not buy at a posted price higher than their consumption value, VijP , and (2) do not allow
a good to remain unsold at a price below VijP . In the posted-price setting however, these
assumptions generate a clear strategy for posted-price buyers: indicate a willingness to buy
if the posted price is less than or equal to VijP and refuse to buy otherwise. Despite being
generated from assumptions that are analogous to those made in the auction case, the model
for posted-price buyers is complete.
If the parameters of F vk (vijk) are γk (location) and δk (scale), then it follows that
the parameters of Fk(Vijk) are γk + Z¯kβk (location) and δk (scale). Z¯k is a vector of the
mean values for each covariate in Zk and has a k subscript for mechanism because I take
the mean for sellers in each mechanism separately. The remaining structural parameters
are βk, the parameter vector on the covariates Z in buyers’ value specification, which can
be recovered by OLS in a hedonic regression.
17Peters and Severinov (2006) detail a complete model that is well-suited for the eBay environment but it
is difficult to extend their model to a structural setting because values are discrete (i.e., lie on a finite grid)
and the bidding game has multiple equilibria, only some of which can be characterized.
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Estimation of the Buyers’ Side of the Marketplace
I express the probability that a good sells and use maximum likelihood to estimate
the structural parameters for buyers. The likelihood function says that the probability of
sale is the probability that at least one of the nj buyers who chose seller j has a consumption
value above her price, rj or pj , weighted by the probability distribution of nj :
Pr(SalejA) =
NA∑
nj=1
(
NA
nj
)
(
exp(XjθA − rjαA)
1 +
∑MA
l=1 exp(XlθA − rlαA)
)nj
· (1− exp(XjθA − rjαA)
1 +
∑MA
l=1 exp(XlθA − rlαA)
)NA−nj
· (1− (exp(− exp(−rj − γA − Z¯AβˆA
δA
)))nj ), (II.4)
Pr(SalejP ) =
NP∑
nj=1
(
NP
nj
)
(
exp(XjθP − pjαP )
1 +
∑MP
l=1 exp(XlθP − plαP )
)nj
· (1− exp(XjθP − pjαP )
1 +
∑MP
l=1 exp(XlθP − plαP )
)NP−nj
· (1− (exp(− exp(−pj − γP − Z¯P βˆP
δP
)))nj ). (II.5)
The structural parameters are θk, αk , and the parameters of the value distribution, γk and
δk.
There are several advantages of this approach. First, I am able to jointly estimate
the seller-choice and trade stages of the game. Second, I avoid any potential selection bias
by using all observations, while some approaches (in auction markets) use only auctions
in which at least two bids were placed. Third, data from posted-price markets are less
amenable to the estimation techniques typically used with auction data because many of
these techniques are based on the selling price. It is difficult to make structural inference
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Table 10. Potential Buyers and Sellers
Condition N M NM
NA
MA
NP
MP
ρB ρS
New 61.58 43.96 1.593 1.482 1.942 49.76% 56.86%
(6.838) (5.517) (0.069) (0.084) (0.123) (0.021) (0.019)
Used 27.62 12.87 2.625 2.672 2.507 76.74% 71.93%
(1.526) (0.825) (0.188) (0.125) (0.374) (0.017) (0.014)
All 46.91 30.53 2.039 1.996 2.186 61.42% 63.37%
(4.099) (3.321) (0.097) (0.083) (0.177) (0.017) (0.013)
Notes: For this and subsequent tables, standard errors are in parentheses. N and M are
the total numbers of buyers and sellers, respectively. These figures are the mean values
across all {CD,week, condition} tuples. NM is the ratio of buyers to sellers. ρB and ρS are
the share of buyers and sellers, respectively, who enter the auction mechanism.
on the buyers’ side of the posted-price market based on the selling price, given that the
price is not determined as an outcome of the trade stage as it is in the auction market.
Results
Sellers
Table 10 breaks down the allocation of buyers and sellers in the two markets for
new and used goods separately. First note that there are more buyers and sellers of new
goods. Further, the number of buyers per seller is low, as described in the introduction.
The buyer to seller ratios for the two markets are roughly equal except when considering
only new goods, where their equality can be rejected (t = −3.07, p-value = 0.00). As a
result, some buyers (sellers) may have an incentive to deviate to the auction (posted-price)
market. However, these summary statistics are only suggestive and do not take into account
factors such as the mix of albums across markets. Finally, the share of both buyers and
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Table 11. Sellers’ Revenues and Earnings
Ex Ante Ex Post
v0 Selling Price Pr(Sale) E(Rev) E(Earnings) E(Rev) E(Earnings)
Auction $5.31 $9.87 50.82% $10.07 $8.18 $8.02 $5.01
(0.032) (0.081) (0.007) (0.080) (0.106) (0.054) (0.082)
Posted Price $6.50 $13.11 23.80% $7.42 $2.94 $7.84 $3.12
(0.111) (0.197) (0.009) (0.113) (0.061) (0.113) (0.129)
All $5.72 $10.42 42.52% $9.17 $6.40 $7.97 $4.43
(0.044) (0.079) (0.006) (0.069) (0.084) (0.051) (0.070)
Notes: Selling price is the price for which the good sold if it sold, while Pr(Sale) is the
share of goods that sold. Each seller’s revenue is the selling price if the good sold and the
seller’s outside option otherwise. Each seller’s earnings is the selling price if the good sold
and zero otherwise. Ex ante quantities are expectations and ex post quantities are the
realized outcomes.
sellers of used goods is larger in the auction market.18
A seller’s primary concern is expected revenue, defined as the payoff from a sale
times the probability of sale plus the payoff from the outside option times the probability
of no sale. I also consider expected earnings, which are the payoff from selling the good
times the probability of sale. Earnings are of interest because my formulation for earnings
is more comparable with other papers that do not consider the value of the outside option.
In Table 11, revenues and earnings are expressed in both ex ante and ex post terms. Ex ante
quantities reflect expectations taken prior to the realization of nj , the number of buyers by
whom seller j is chosen. As argued in Section II.4.1.2, sellers set the price that maximizes
their ex ante expected revenue. Ex post revenues and earnings consider the realized selling
price of the good.
Table 11 suggests that posted-price goods earn higher prices but sell with a lower
probability. Auction revenues are higher both ex ante and ex post but only ex ante
expected revenues are meaningfully higher (tex ante = 19.23, tex post = 1.42). For earnings,
18In contrast, Anderson et al. (2004) find that used goods were more likely (than new goods) to be sold
at a posted price in the market for Palm Vx handheld computers on eBay.
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the auction market fares even better against the posted-price market. The difference in
the results for revenues and earnings is explained by the fact that posted-price sellers have
more valuable outside options than auctioneers.
The value of each seller’s outside option can be inferred from her pricing decision,
meaning that its distribution H
(
v0
)
is identified without any assumption on its parametric
form. Figure 1 provides a histogram of the outside options overlaid with a kernel density
plot separately for each market. While the means (shown in Table 11) provide evidence
that sellers in the two markets have different outside options, the distributions tell much
more. Outside options are concentrated around $5 to $7 dollars for auctioneers; 50% of
the v0’s fall in this interval. On the other hand, posted-price sellers have outside options
that are somewhat uniformly distributed between $0 and $10. A meaningful fraction (9%)
exceeds $12 in the posted-price market, while this is true for less than 1% of auctioneers.
Further, 46% of posted-price sellers have outside options valued above $7 compared to less
than 8% of all auctioneers.
The final item of interest for sellers is the distribution of costs, G(ω). The results
from a logit estimation of the auction dummy on the difference in expected revenues are
in Table 12.19 Intuitively, I find that sellers who expect a larger revenue advantage for
the auction mechanism are more like to sell in an auction. The main purpose of Table
12, however, is in transforming the coefficients to recover the parameters of G(ω). These
parameters, µ (location) and σ (scale), show how sellers view the cost of offering an auction
in relation to the costs of posting a fixed price. The fact that µ is less than 0 says that the
auction mechanism is less costly, on average.
Taken together, the findings for sellers’ outside options and their costs imply that
19The unit of observation in this estimation is an individual seller. If a seller lists the same CD of the same
condition in the same week, she is counted only once. This assumes that sellers choose between mechanisms
separately for each CD and separately for new and used goods.
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Figure 1. Densities of v0 by Market
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Table 12. Sellers’ Cost Distribution
G(ω) location: µ −3.704
(0.500)∗∗
G(ω) scale: σ 7.933
(0.664)∗∗
E(RevA)− E(RevP ) 0.125
(0.010)∗∗
Constant 0.463
(0.038)∗∗
Observations 3653
Log-Likelihood Value −2251.485
LR χ2 Statistic 173.75
Pr > χ2 0.000
Notes: ∗ and ∗∗ denote significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. The unit of
observation is an individual seller as described in footnote 19. The values for µ (location)
and σ (scale) are the estimates of the parameters of the sellers’ cost distribution, G(ω).
The coefficient on E(RevA)− E(RevP ) and the constant term are the estimates from a
logit maximum-likelihood estimation of the auction dummy. If B0 is the constant term
and B1 is the coefficient, then µ = −B0B1 and σ = 1B1 . See equation (II.1).
costs are not the entire story. Costs do not completely explain the coexistence of auctions
and posted-price selling because costs, on average, favor the auction mechanism. An
interpretation is that there are two types of posted-price sellers: (1) sellers with a valuable
outside option and (2) sellers with a low-valued outside option but with a large ωjA relative
to ωjP . The decision of type (1) sellers to enter the posted-price mechanism can be
explained in the context of a monopolist. In the monopoly case, the revenue advantage of
the auction over the posted-price mechanism is decreasing in v0. When v0 equals the upper
bound of the buyers’ value distribution, the two mechanisms generate the same expected
revenue because the seller will set a price such that she never sells the good. In my model,
the same factors are at work. Sellers with valuable outside options view the mechanisms
more similarly than sellers with low-valued outside options. As a result, the coexistence
of mechanisms is more likely to occur in the former case. In contrast, the decision of type
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(2) sellers cannot be rationalized by their v0. Here, the model predicts that these sellers
must have a sufficiently large ωjA − ωjP . Factors such as risk aversion, impatience, and
inventories are likely causes.
Buyers
Table 13 reports a hedonic regression of the good’s selling price on the charac-
teristics (Z) that should influence buyers’ values. These characteristics are the log of the
seller’s feedback score, her feedback rating, a dummy variable for new goods, and CD and
week fixed effects. The score proxies for the quantity of a seller’s reputation and the rating
proxies for quality.20 The seller’s reputation matters somewhat but the results reflect a
weak relationship that has been found elsewhere (Ackerberg et al. 2006; Canals-Cerd and
Pearcy 2006). Further, for the auction market, new goods sell for $1.11 more than used
goods; the difference is $2.13 for posted-price goods.
The main results for buyers are in Table 14. This estimation includes the char-
acteristics (X) believed to influence which seller a buyer chooses. For the auction market,
X includes all of the characteristics in Z in addition to the length of the auction and the
reserve price. Adams (2007) argues that the length of a listing should influence which seller
a buyer chooses but not the buyer’s value. For the posted-price market, I do not observe a
listing’s length, so X includes the characteristics in Z in addition to the posted price. The
results for the coefficients on the reserve price, αA, and the posted price, αP , indicate that
buyers respond in the expected way to higher prices; I discuss these results in detail in the
next section.
20Both measures are calculated by eBay based on post-transaction reports submitted by buyers on the
sellers from whom they purchase a good. The seller’s score is the number of positive reports minus the
number of negative reports, while her rating is the number of positive reports divided by the total number of
reports. I add two to the feedback score so that all sellers have a positive value and take the log to account
for nonlinearities.
50
Table 13. Buyers’ Hedonic Regression
Auction Posted-Price
Market Market
Ln(Seller’s Score) 0.020 0.216
(0.023) (0.051)∗∗
Seller’s Rating 3.478 −4.253
(1.724)∗ (15.261)
New Good 1.108 2.131
(0.125)∗∗ (0.351)∗∗
Constant 2.164 12.156
(1.831) (15.133)
Observations 2487 489
R2 0.60 0.71
Notes: The dependent variable is the selling price of the good. Only sold goods are
included. The coefficients for CD and week fixed effects are suppressed for both
regressions.
Table 14. Buyers’ Estimation Results
Auction Posted-Price
Market Market
F vk (v) location: γk 4.267 0.723
(0.524)∗∗ (3.006)
Fk(V ) location: γk + Z¯βk 12.129 10.934
(0.524)∗∗ (3.006)∗∗
F vk (v) & Fk(v) scale: δk 5.687 12.227
(0.534)∗∗ (5.860)∗∗
Price (Reserve or Posted) −0.463 −0.321
(0.057)∗∗ (0.038)∗∗
Ln(Seller’s Score) −1.480 0.053
(0.182)∗∗ (0.038)
Seller’s Rating 10.815 9.558
(5.361)∗ (7.395)
Length of Listing 1.064
(0.119)∗∗
Constant 1.580 −8.695
(5.347) (7.406)
Observations 4894 2005
Log-Likelihood Value −2336.082 −910.354
LR χ2 Statistic 324.08 57.65
Pr > χ2 0.000 0.000
Notes: The results are from maximizing the likelihood functions shown in equations II.4
and II.5.
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The distribution of values is the key primitive for buyers. While the model
provides no formal prediction on the stochastic ordering of the two distributions, they should
be similar across markets.21 The results suggest that FA(V ) is centered around $12.13 and
FP (V ) around $10.93. The difference between these central locations is not statistically
significant (t = 0.39, p-value = 0.70) but $1.20 is an economically meaningful amount given
the inexpensive nature of CDs. If I remove the effects of observable characteristics (X) and
look only at buyers’ idiosyncratic values, the difference across the auction and posted-price
markets is larger, yet still statistically insignificant (t = 1.16, p-value = 0.25). I also fail
to reject that δA = δP (t = −1.11, p-value = 0.27) but it should be noted that these two
parameters are meaningfully different (δA = 5.69, δP = 12.23). The test fails to reject only
because δP is estimated with a great deal of noise.
The remaining quantities in Table 14 show the effects of observable characteristics
on which seller a buyers chooses. The quality of the seller’s reputation (her rating) matters
in the expected way but is estimated imprecisely. The quantity of her reputation hurts a
seller in the auction market and does little to help in the posted-price market. Finally, I
use estimates of the share of buyers that each seller receives, qjk, to find the share of buyers
who exit the market, q0k. 23.8% of auction buyers and 69.2% of posted-price buyers exit
and choose seller 0. That more posted-price buyers than auction buyers exit the market
is consistent with buyers exiting when their value is too low given that the lowest posted
price is above the lowest reserve price for all CDs in these data.
21Because buyers draw their values after entering a particular mechanism, the model does not require the
distributions to be the same (hence Fk(·) has a k subscript). But, if the estimated distributions are not
similar, then the assumption that buyers mix between mechanisms may be unreasonable.
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Intensity of Price Competition
The key advantage of the structural approach is that the magnitudes of the esti-
mates have a precise interpretation. As a result, I am able to use the structural parameters
to measure the competitiveness of the market: first, by quantifying the intensity of price
competition and second, by measuring consumer surplus. As argued in Section II.4.1.2,
the estimates for αA and αP are useful measures of the competitiveness of the auction and
posted-price markets. I calculate the elasticity of qjk with respect to price, measured at the
means for each market. The auction elasticity is −2.06, while the posted-price elasticity
is −4.62. These elasticities suggest that buyers are highly responsive to changes in price.
That buyers are more responsive to the posted price is intuitive given that the posted price
is the price that a buyer actually pays, while the reserve price is only the starting point of
the bidding process.
I also measure the intensity of price competition using Lerner-type indices equal
to
rj−v0jA
rj
and
pj−v0jP
pj
. The means for the auction and posted-price market are 0.155 and
0.508, respectively. The difference is even larger when comparing the medians, which are
0.001 (auction) and 0.544 (posted price). From the auction market, the reserve price mark-
up is approximately zero for the majority of sellers but the distribution of the mark-ups is
positively skewed. Comparing the two markets indicates that posted-price sellers charge
prices that are meaningfully above the value of their outside options, to a larger extent than
auctioneers.
Consumer Surplus
Another way to measure the competitiveness of the online compact-disc market is
consumer surplus. First consider the auction market. The realized consumer surplus in an
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individual auction is the difference between the highest bidder’s value and the winning bid.
Because the highest-bidder’s value is not observed, I follow the convention of estimating
expected consumer surplus (Song 2004; Giray et al. 2006). Define bw as the winning bid
and let V (n−1:n)A refer to the buyer with the second-highest out of n values:
E[CSA|V (n−1:n)A = bw] =
∫∞
bw V · fA(V )dV
1− FA(bw) − b
w.
The formulation in the posted-price market is similar but the logic is different. As be-
fore, we want the expected value of the buyer who obtains the good minus the price he
pays. However, the buyer who obtains the good in the posted-price market is chosen ran-
domly from the set of buyers who chose the seller and have a value above her posted price.
Expected consumer surplus is:
E[CSP |ViP > p] =
∫∞
p V · fP (V )dV
1− FP (p) − p.
On average, the expected consumer surplus per good is $7.91 and $14.88 in the
auction and posted-price markets, respectively.22 After calculating producer surplus, I find
the share of total surplus that is received by consumers: E[CSATSA ] = 64.5% and E[
CSP
TSP
] =
69.4%. Figures at the median are $8.29 (73.0%) for the auction market and $15.04 (72.0%)
for the posted-price market. One explanation for posted-price buyers receiving a higher
(absolute) surplus is the larger variance of FP (V ) relative to FA(V ), implying that the
posted-price distribution has more weight in its right tail. Recall though that the scale
parameter of FP (V ) is estimated imprecisely.
22While it may not be intuitive, expected consumer surplus in both markets is independent of N or Nk.
For the auction market, Giray et al. (2006) provide a simple proof. For the posted-price market, E[CSP ]
is independent of NP because the winning buyer is chosen randomly among those with a value above the
posted price.
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Conclusion
I examine the competitive structure of a marketplace that features simultaneous
auctions and posted-price selling. Several novel aspects of my estimation approach allow
new insights into how sellers choose between selling in an auction and posting a fixed price.
Most importantly, the value of each seller’s outside option is identified using an optimality
condition from the seller’s pricing problem. As a result, I can recover the distribution of
these outside options without any assumption on its parametric form. The distribution
of sellers’ costs can be estimated in a simple, univariate discrete-choice model. On the
demand side, I am able to estimate the distribution of values under weak assumptions that
hold in numerous models of bidding or posted-price buying. Finally, I use a new technique
for identifying the unobserved number of potential buyers in the posted-price market. My
results compare favorably to an approach that assumes there are infinitely many buyers.
I find that a seller chooses which mechanism to enter based on the value of her
outside option. Since, the value of each seller’s outside option is identified, I am able to
quantify the degree to which sellers are pricing competitively. The findings suggest that
buyers in the online compact-disc market are highly responsive to price. Higher prices have
a large, negative effect on the share of buyers who choose a particular seller. In response,
sellers price competitively and the majority of auctioneers set a price equal to the value
of their outside option. These results reconcile the commonly-cited revenue-dominance
property of the auction mechanism with the observation that many sellers choose to post a
fixed price.
Appendix - Optimal Pricing
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Seller j’s expected revenue for each mechanism is:
E(RevjA) =
N∑
NA=1
{
(
N
NA
)
ρNAB (1− ρB)N−NA
NA∑
nj=0
{
(
NA
nj
)
q
nj
jA(1− qjA)NA−nj
·(nj
∫ ∞
rj
(vfA(v) + FA(v)− 1)FA(v)nj−1dv + F (rj)nj · v0jA)}}, (A1)
E(RevjP ) =
N∑
NP=1
{
(
N
NP
)
(1− ρB)NP ρBN−NP
NP∑
nj=0
{
(
NP
nj
)
qjP
nj (1− qjP )NP−nj
· ((1− FP (pj)nj )pj + F (pj)nj · v0jP )}}. (A2)
Fk(V ) is the distribution of buyers’ consumption values, Vijk: Fk(V ) = exp(− exp(−V−γkδk )),
with density: fk(V ) = 1δk exp(−
V−γk
δk
) exp(− exp(−V−γkδk )). Equation II.3 defines qjk.
The parameters ρB, θk, and αk, along with the parameters of Fk(v) are common
knowledge, implying that sellers can forecast the expected revenue in each mechanism. The
expected revenue in the mechanism that the seller entered can be found by inserting these
parameters along with the price charged (rj or pj) and v0jk. On the other hand, the expected
revenue in the mechanism that the seller did not enter is more complicated. In theory, the
seller could use the structural parameters along with v0jk to calculate the optimal price in
the other mechanism. I argue that it seems unlikely that sellers are able to engage in this
level of optimization. Instead, I assume that sellers use a heuristic for the price that they
would charge (counterfactually) in the mechanism that they did not enter. Specifically, I
assume that sellers expect to charge a price in each mechanism that earns the same share
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of buyers and therefore expect the following equality to hold:
exp(XjθA − rjαA)
1 +
∑MA
l=1 exp(XlθA − rlαA)
=
exp(XjθP − pjαP )
1 +
∑MP
l=1 exp(XlθP − plαP )
.
Using this restriction, sellers can calculate the optimal price in one mechanism and use this
equation to solve for the price in the other mechanism. Once a seller knows these two
prices, she chooses the mechanism offering the highest profit, where pijk = E(Revjk)− ωjk.
For comparison, consider two results from the auction literature. First, the optimal
reserve price for a monopolist, rM , solves the following equation (Myerson 1981):
rMj = v
0
jA +
1− FA(rMj )
fA(rMj )
.
Second, the literature on competing sellers (see Section II.1.2) shows that, under certain
conditions, all sellers set a reserve price at the value of their outside option, rCj = v
0
j .
Many of these results rely on limit concepts where the number of sellers goes to infinity
(e.g., McAfee (1993)). In my model, the optimal reserve price, r∗j , maximizes equation (A1).
Differentiating this function shows that r∗j = r
M
j when αA = 0, while r
∗
j approaches v
0
jA
from above when αA → ∞. The latter could occur because the number of sellers is very
large or because buyers are very sensitive to price. Monotonicity of E(Revk) in price insures
that r∗j lies in the interval [v
0
jA, r
M
j ].
The optimal posted price cannot be bounded as easily because with αP = 0, the
optimal posted price in my model depends nj , while with αA = 0, the optimal reserve price
does not. As a result, any comparison between a seller in my model when αP = 0 and
a monopolist depends on the number of buyers that the monopolist faces. Consider a
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monopolist and define pMj as her optimal posted price when facing nj buyers:
pMj = v
0
jP +
1− FP (pMj )nj
njFP (pMj )
nj−1fP (pMj )
.
When αP = 0, one can show that the optimal posted price of seller j may exceed pMj when
the expected number of buyers is the same in the two cases (nj = qjP ·Np). For example,
if v0jP = 0, Np = 20, qjP =
1
10 , and FP (·) is the Gumbel distribution recovered in Section
II.5.2, then the optimal posted price of seller j is $21.69 while the optimal posted price of a
monopolist facing 2 buyers (2 = qjP ·Np) is $20.33. This example illustrates that an upper
bound analogous to rMj does not exist for the posted-price mechanism, even when αP = 0
and each seller can raise her price without influencing the number of buyers that she faces.
There is a clear lower bound though because no seller should price below v0jP .
Appendix - Testable Assumptions
The key drawback of the structural approach is that stronger assumptions (relative
to a reduced-form approach) are required for estimation. This appendix tests many of the
key assumptions.
The Nature of Demand
The main restriction placed on the demand structure is that of a symmetric-
independent-private-values (SIPV) framework. By using a SIPV model, I assume that all
buyers draw their values from F vk (v) and that these values are i.i.d. random variables. While
the econometric literature has developed a number of ways to test the appropriateness of
the SIPV assumptions using auction data, I know of no analogous approach using data from
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posted-price markets. As a result, I test the SIPV assumptions using only the auction data.
In an auction setting, Athey and Haile (2002) show that the SIPV framework is testable if
either: (1) more than one bid per auction is observed or (2) there is exogenous variation
in the number of buyers. While multiple bids are observed in eBay data, the truncation
of bidders discussed earlier implies that the interpretation of bids below the second highest
is unclear. As a result, I am unable to use a testing approach that requires multiple bids
(such as an approach based on equation (13) in Athey and Haile (2002)).23
On the other hand, there are reasons to believe that I can exploit exogenous varia-
tion in the number of buyers. Recall that I group observations into {CD,week, condition,
mechanism} tuples and estimate Nk separately for each group. Accordingly, Nk varies by
CD, by week, by condition (new or used), and by mechanism. If the variation along one of
these dimensions can be taken as plausibly exogenous, then I can estimate F vA(·) separately
across this dimension and test for the appropriateness of the SIPV assumptions. I argue
that time is the most likely dimension to generate exogenous variation in NA. While the
demand for CDs certainly changes over time, the sample period of 45 days is likely short
enough to avoid depreciation in demand due to a CD losing popularity. Further, the argu-
ment that there may be additional differences between distributions for the early and late
periods provides more evidence against the null, biasing the test against me. I divide the
sample into two periods and test F v,earlyA (·) = F v,lateA (·). The results in Table 15 support
the SIPV assumptions in that I fail to reject the equality of the two parameters.
23Using eBay data, Zeithammer and Adams (2007) reject that multiple bids per auction can be taken
truthfully revealing the buyer’s value.
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Table 15. Testing Private-Values Assumption
Auction Market
Obs γA δA
Early 2743 4.952 5.656
(1.599) (1.164)
Late 2151 4.629 5.915
(0.631) (0.724)
Difference 0.323 −0.259
(1.719) (1.370)
t-Statistic 0.188 −0.189
p-value 0.851 0.850
Notes: The test fails to reject the null of private values when the p-value is greater than
0.05.
Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives
The share of buyers that each seller receives, qjk, is restricted by the IIA prop-
erty of the Gumbel distribution. To check whether IIA is rejected in these data, I fol-
low Hausman and McFadden (1984) and compare the results from the full model to a
restricted model where buyers can choose from only a subset of the sellers. I choose the
restricted set to include all sellers except the low-price seller, dropping one seller for each
{CD,week, condition,mechanism} group. By dropping the seller with the lowest price, I
induce the largest possible shift in buyers. As a result, the test is more likely to reject IIA
than tests with higher-priced sellers. I find that IIA is not rejected in these data, provid-
ing support for the Gumbel distributional assumption (for the auction market, χ2 = 4.87,
p-value = 0.30; for the posted-price market, χ2 = 5.91, p-value = 0.20).
Multinomial Distribution
I have assumed that the number of buyers who choose each seller follows a multi-
nomial distribution. An alternative approach is to assume that the number of potential
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buyers in each market is infinite and use a Poisson distribution for the number of buyers
who choose each seller. Under this assumption, the mean number of arrivals, λjk, at each
seller j is a function of Xj and τjk (recall that τ is the payment that a buyer expects to
make). In my setting, λjk is interpreted as the mean number of buyers who arrive at seller
j’s listing before it closes. One downside to using a Poisson approach is that it is more
difficult to motivate the empirical specification with an underlying theoretical framework,
such as the random-utility-maximization model used in this paper.
I now outline an estimation strategy based on a Poisson specification to check which
provides a better fit for the data. The reduced-form specification is: λjk = Xjθk − τjk,
where τjA = rjαA and τjP = pjαP as before. The likelihood functions are:
Pr(SalejA) =
∞∑
nj=1
(XjθA − rjαA)nj exp(−(XjθA − rjαA))
nj !
(1− FA(rj)nj ), (B1)
Pr(SalejP ) =
∞∑
nj=1
(XjθP − pjαP )nj exp(−(XjθP − pjαP ))
nj !
(1− FP (pj)nj ). (B2)
Results are in Table 16; the differences with those in Table 14 are stark. The estimate of
α is only significantly different from zero in the auction market. Further, the recovered
distribution is shifted toward lower values in relation to the distribution recovered using a
multinomial approach.24
Because the multinomial and Poisson models are non-nested, I compare them
24While the number of buyers is said to be infinite in the Poisson model, in practice it is necessary for
the researcher to specify an upper bound for the summation. I find that the mean of the distribution varies
depending on the upper bound because, in order to explain the number of goods that remain unsold in
the data, the buyers’ value distribution must shift to the left as the upper bound gets larger. I choose an
upper bound based on the seller who is chosen by the largest number of buyers in the multinomial model
(max(qjA ·NA) = 7, max(qjP ·NP ) = 4).
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Table 16. Buyers’ Poisson Estimation Results
Auction Posted-Price
Market Market
F vk (v) location: γk −7.093 −3.313
(0.942)∗∗ (0.884)∗∗
Fk(V ) location: γk + Z¯βk 0.769 6.897
(0.942) (0.884)∗∗
F vk (v) & Fk(v) scale: δk 12.517 5.010
(1.547)∗∗ (0.600)∗∗
Price, Reserve or Posted −0.085 −0.043
(0.005)∗∗ (0.036)
Ln(Seller’s Score) −0.394 0.059
(0.017)∗∗ (0.052)
Seller’s Rating 1.391 8.901
(0.660)∗ (2.548)∗∗
Length of Listing 0.279
(0.015)∗∗
Constant 3.453 −6.945
(0.708)∗∗ (2.463)∗∗
Observations 4894 2005
Log-Likelihood Value −2490.726 −957.421
LR χ2 Statistic 1234.09 5.18
Pr > χ2 0.000 0.159
Notes: The results are from maximizing the likelihood functions shown in equations B1
and B2.
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using a Vuong (1989) test. The results indicate that the multinomial approach is closer to
the truth (for the auction market, Z = 5.89, p-value = 0.00; for the posted-price market,
Z = 3.16, p-value = 0.00).
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CHAPTER III
Selling to Buyers with Correlated Values in Auction and Posted-Price Markets
I use a laboratory setting to study the pricing decisions of a monopolist in auction and posted-price
markets. Experimental subjects set a price to sell a single, indivisible good to buyers as the level
and nature of demand changes. The question of interest is whether sellers correctly recognize the
role played by correlation among buyers’ values. The prices set by subjects in the experiment closely
match the risk-neutral benchmark predictions when demand follows the independent-private-values
framework. In contrast, subjects fail to correctly account for correlation among buyers’ values once
the independence assumption is dropped. I offer two new models of pricing in a correlated-values
environment. The model that suggests sellers ignore correlation outperforms both the benchmark
and the model that suggests sellers incorrectly account for correlation.
Introduction
The distribution of buyers’ values determines what fraction of the buyers have
a willingness-to-pay at or below a particular price. A market’s demand therefore can be
characterized by analyzing the statistical and economic properties of the value distribution.
The property of interest in this paper is the degree of correlation among buyers’ values.
When there is no correlation, values are independent and private, that is, i.i.d. random
variables. When the degree of correlation increases, values are identically but no longer
independently distributed random variables.
In this paper, subjects in a laboratory experiment are asked to set prices in auction
and posted-price markets. I compare prices in the experiment to several theoretical models
to understand how sellers incorporate correlation among buyers’ values into their pricing
decisions. Numerous experimental papers find that the benchmark model of pricing in
auction and posted-price markets performs well when buyers’ values follow the independent-
private-values paradigm (e.g., Ketcham, Smith, and Williams (1984)). (The experimental
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results of the present paper also finds this to be the case.) My question is whether the same
is true in a more complicated environment, in particular when buyers’ values are correlated.
Are experimental sellers equally likely to set the revenue-maximizing price in environments
of uncorrelated and correlated values? If not, do models that account for optimization
errors with respect to the role of correlation provide a better fit for the data?
By approaching these questions using data from a controlled laboratory setting
instead of a naturally-occurring market, I can more carefully isolate the effect of changes
in the economic environment on a seller’s pricing decisions. Experimental papers that
study market institutions typically focus on buyer behavior, seller behavior, or comparing
mechanisms (Kagel 1995; Davis and Holt 1996). Because this paper studies sellers, I
abstract from the strategic considerations of buyers and the design of or preferences over
mechanisms. The experiment uses robotic buyers, meaning that buyers’ bidding/purchase
decisions are performed by the computer. The use of computerized buyers whose strategies
are known to the seller sharpens the focus on the seller’s pricing decisions by reducing the
level of strategic uncertainty.
The question of how agents behave in complicated demand environments has re-
ceived previous attention. Hortasu and Puller (2008) study a naturally-occurring electricity
market that features complex strategic interactions between firms bidding to sell power in
Texas. They find that large firms bid in a way that is more consistent with profit maximiza-
tion, while small firms leave “money on the table” by bidding in ways that are inconsistent
with profit maximization. While Hortasu and Puller discuss bidding behavior, their paper
provides some insight into what changes we should expect in sellers’ pricing behavior when
the demand environments becomes more complicated.
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The next section outlines the way in which a monopolist’s revenue-maximizing
price changes as the level of demand changes from low (two buyers) to high (five buyers).
After presenting the experimental design and results, I introduce two new models of naive
pricing. Each naive-pricing model collapses to the benchmark model when buyers’ values
are uncorrelated but misspecifies the role of correlation when values are correlated. Taking
the three models to the data suggests that modifying the benchmark model to account
for optimization errors provides a closer match of the level of subjects’ prices and the
comparative-static results in the correlated environment.
Benchmark Model
A risk-neutral monopolist offers for sale a single, indivisible unit of a good to n
risk-neutral buyers whose participation decisions are exogenous. The seller’s value for the
good is set equal to 0. The buyers’ values are symmetrically drawn from F (v), which is
assumed to be continuously differentiable. Let its first derivative f(v) satisfy the monotone-
likelihood-ratio property (Milgrom and Weber 1982). I use a conditionally-independent
private-values (CIPV) model; buyers draw their values independently, conditional on a
parameter that is common to all buyers. If µ denotes the common parameter, buyers’
values are i.i.d. according to F (v|µ). The CIPV model is equivalent to the independent-
private-values (IPV) model when F (v) = F (v|µ). Finally, let the distribution G(·) of the
common component be continuously differentiable with first derivative g(·).
The two markets considered are the second-price sealed-bid auction and the posted-
price market. In the auction market, the seller sets a (public) reserve price and the good is
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sold to the highest bidder if his bid is greater than or equal to the reserve price.1 The selling
price is the maximum of the reserve price and the second-highest bid. In the posted-price
market, the seller sets a posted price and the good is sold to a buyer who is willing to pay
the posted price. In the laboratory experiment described in the next section, robotic buyers
execute the dominant strategy in each market: enter a truthful bid (i.e., a bid equal to the
buyer’s value) in the auction and choose to buy if doing so provides a non-negative payoff
in the posted-price market. A second-price auction is appealing in this context because the
strategy that robotic buyers will follow when bidding is easy for subjects to understand.
To think about optimal pricing, I express the monopolist’s expected revenue
E(Rev) as a function of µ, then optimize over the reserve or posted price (Wang 1998).
If µ ∈ [µ, µ¯] and vi ∈ [v (µ) , v¯(µ)], then expected revenues in the two mechanisms are:
E(RevA) =n
∫ µ¯
µ
∫ v¯(µ)
r
(vf (v|µ) + F (v|µ)− 1)F (v|µ)n−1 dv · g (µ) dµ,
E(RevP ) =
∫ µ¯
µ
p (1− F (p|µ)n) g (µ) dµ.
The optimal reserve price satisfies2:
0 = −n
∫ µ¯
µ
(rf (r|µ) + F (r|µ)− 1)F (r|µ)n−1 g (µ) dµ, (III.1)
while the optimal posted price satisfies:
0 =
∫ µ¯
µ
(
1− F (p|µ)n − npF (p|µ)n−1 f (p|µ)
)
g (µ) dµ. (III.2)
1Note that the common auction formats are not revenue equivalent when values are not independent.
Second-price auctions revenue dominate first-price auctions (Milgrom and Weber 1982).
2Wang (1998) provides the second-order conditions, which are met by the distributions used in experiment.
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When F (v) = F (v|µ), these optimality conditions become:
r =
1− F (r)
f(r)
, (III.3)
p =
1− F (p)n
nF (p)n−1f(p)
. (III.4)
I use there results to predict how the reserve and posted prices should change as the
number of buyers increases. Values are uncorrelated when F (v) = F (v|µ) and correlated
otherwise.
Parameterization of the Model
The laboratory experiment uses the affiliated-signals model of Kagel, Harstad, and
Levin (1987), where buyers’ values are determined in two stages:
1. µ is drawn from a uniform distribution on [a, b],
2. then, the n buyers’ values are independently drawn from a uniform distribution on
[µ− ε, µ+ ε].
In summary, G(µ) = µ−ab−a and F (v|µ) = v−µ+ε2ε .
The degree of correlation among buyers’ values is captured by b − a. When
b− a = 0, values are uncorrelated. Values become more highly correlated as a and b move
further apart. The two environments considered are:
1. (Uncorrelated) Let a = b = ε = 10: buyers’ values are determined in one stage, drawn
uniformly from the integers [0, 20].
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2. (Correlated) Let a = ε = 5 and b = 15: µ is drawn uniformly from the integers [5, 15],
then buyers’ values are drawn uniformly from the integers [µ− 5, µ+ 5].
The two-by-two-by-two design generates eight treatments: market (auction versus
posted price), level of demand (two versus five buyers), and degree of correlation among
buyers’ values (uncorrelated versus correlated values). The optimal prices for each treatment
are in Table 18 (found in Section III.5) and details are in Appendix III.7.
Within this framework, I test the following hypotheses that deal with how sellers’
pricing decisions change in response to a change in the level of demand.
Hypothesis 1 In the auction market, sellers do not change their reserve prices as the
number of buyers increases in the uncorrelated environment.
Hypothesis 2 In the auction market, sellers reduce their reserve prices as the number of
buyers increases in the correlated environment.
Hypothesis 3 In the posted-price market, sellers increase their posted prices as the number
of buyers increases for a fixed degree of correlation.
The predictions in the auction market are discussed in detail in Levin and Smith
(1996). For the posted-price market, the predictions are intuitive and can be seen in the
model of the present paper by inspection of the expected revenues in Appendix III.7.
Experimental Design and Procedures
Subjects were recruited to participate in an experiment whose purpose was to
“observe pricing decisions.” The functioning of each market was explained according to the
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instructions in Appendix III.8. Before being asked to set a price, subjects were told the
number of buyers and whether buyers’ values were uncorrelated or correlated. As can be
seen in Figure 5, the description of the environment was shown at the time of each pricing
decision. Subjects’ prices were restricted to the real numbers between 0 and 20. Though
they were not restricted to integers, no subject set a non-integer price.
It was explained to subjects that buyers’ values were randomly drawn integers
determined by the treatment in question. Subjects were told that buyers’ values and (in
the correlated environment) µ were redrawn between rounds, where µ is the mean of the
first stage of the affiliated-signals model. Throughout the experiment, µ was referred to as
X for clarity and it was explained to subjects that they would not be told X until after a
price was entered. Further, subjects were told that buyers’ actions were simulated and the
dominant strategy that the robotic buyers would execute was explained. By using robotic
buyers and monopolistic markets, I avoid having any interactions among subjects during
the experiment and subjects’ earnings depended only on the results of their own pricing
decisions.
The experiment took place at Vanderbilt University during April and May of 2008.
The thirty-five subjects had little experience in economic experiments and only two subjects
had participated in a previous auction or posted-price experiment. There were 63 rounds
and the total time from login to payment ranged from 30 to 45 minutes. For the eight
treatments, rounds were distributed as follows: 40 live rounds (5 per treatment) and 23
practice rounds (with the following number before each round (10, 5, 2, 2, 2, 2, 0, 0)). The
practice rounds exactly mimicked the live rounds, with a note prominently indicating that
the round would not be one of the rounds used to determine take-home earnings. Subjects
participated in treatments in random order, the order varied across subjects, and each
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subject participated in each of the eight treatments exactly once.
Take-home earnings had three components: $5 for arriving at the experiment on
time, the revenues from 10 randomly-selected (live) pricing rounds, and the revenue from a
randomly-selected Holt and Laury (2002) lottery. The Holt-Laury procedure is a common
way to estimate risk preferences and was used to check if relaxing the assumption of risk
neutrality provided a better fit for the data. See Appendix III.9 for details. Dollar values
during the experiment were expressed in experimental dollars. The instructions explained
that the exchange rate was 10 : 1. At the end of the experiment, subjects saw which rounds
were used to determine their take-home earnings and earnings were converted to American
dollars. Earnings were advertised to be $15 on average and, in fact, averaged $15.24.
To check their understanding of the instructions, subjects took an ungraded and
a graded quiz (the latter of which is shown in Figure 4). Subjects who failed to correctly
answer 75% of the questions on the graded quiz had to speak with a monitor to clear up
any confusion before retaking the quiz. Following the eighth and final treatment, subjects
were asked to take the Holt-Laury risk survey as well as a demographic survey. Finally
note that subjects were given feedback after each round to speed learning. Figures 6 and 7
are screenshots of two sample feedback pages. Subjects were shown their profit, all buyers’
values, and (in the correlated environment) the value of X.
Results
Price Level
Though my focus is on a comparison across treatments, I begin with a discussion
of how prices differ on average from those predicted by the benchmark model of the paper.
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The results in Table 18 suggest that the benchmark model closely matches the level of prices
in the uncorrelated environment. Only for the two-buyers posted-price treatment does a
Wilcoxon nonparametric signed-ranks test report a failure of the model in terms of the level
of prices (z=3.18, p-value=0.00) and even there the magnitude of the price difference ($0.54)
is small. In the correlated environment however, subjects set prices that are meaningfully
different than predicted. Now consider the comparative-static predictions.
Comparative-Static Results
Throughout, I compare the results from the relevant treatments using Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (K-S) tests, which check for equality of empirical distributions. For each finding,
I provide graphs of the relevant empirical cdfs using all subjects and all rounds.
Finding 1 In the uncorrelated environment of the auction market, subjects do not change
their reserve prices on average as the number of buyers increases but are more likely to set
a low reserve price and less likely to set a high reserve price with five buyers relative to two
buyers.
See the left panel of Figure 2. I reject that the two-buyers and five-buyers dis-
tributions are equivalent (test statistic=0.26, p-value=0.00). A parametric comparison is
useful here as well. While I fail to reject that the mean reserve prices are different for
two and five buyers, the F statistic of a variance-ratio test is 0.54 (p-value=0.00). This
suggests that the five-buyers distribution is a mean-preserving spread of the two-buyers
distribution. I conclude that, while there is a meaningful amount of heterogeneity in the
subject population, the overall response of subjects to an increase in the number of buy-
ers in the uncorrelated environment of the auction market appears to be consistent with
Hypothesis 1.
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Figure 2. Empirical CDFs of Reserve Prices
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Finding 2 In the correlated environment of the auction market, subjects do not change
their reserve prices as the number of buyers increases.
From the right panel of Figure 2, I reject the equality of distributions using all
rounds (test statistic=0.16, p-value=0.02) but fail to reject after excluding rounds 1 and 2
(test statistic=0.14, p-value=0.19). These results suggest that, in contrast to Hypothesis 2,
subjects’ behave similarly across the uncorrelated and correlated environments with respect
to an increase in the number of buyers in the auction market.
Finding 3 In the posted-price market, subjects increase their posted prices as the number
of buyers increases for a fixed degree of correlation.
The results seen in Figure 3 suggest that subjects set higher posted prices when
selling to five buyers relative to two buyers, consistent with Hypothesis 3. K-S tests
provide further support (uncorrelated-values test statistic=0.43, p-value=0.00; correlated-
values test statistic=0.26, p-value=0.00). Price differences are more dramatic in the un-
correlated environment ($2.68) than in the correlated environment ($1.30). The result is
not changed by excluding either round 1 or rounds 1 and 2.
I conclude from these findings that the benchmark model provides a good fit for
pricing behavior in both the level of prices and the predictions across treatments in the
uncorrelated environment. That the same is not true in the correlated environment is
investigated now.
Naive-Pricing Models
The results of the previous section suggest that the pricing behavior of these
subjects is broadly consistent with the comparative-static risk-neutral predictions. The
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Figure 3. Empirical CDFs of Posted Prices
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Table 17. Percent of Maximum Expected Revenue
Uncorrelated Correlated
2 Buyers 5 Buyers 2 Buyers 5 Buyers
Auction 0.916 0.941 0.863 0.783
(0.010) (0.008) (0.017) (0.024)
Posted Price 0.902 0.919 0.809 0.626
(0.010) (0.009) (0.021) (0.029)
Notes: Expected revenue is the revenue that a subject should expect ex ante to earn based
on the price set. Percent of maximum expected revenue is the subject’s expected revenue
divided by the maximum expected revenue (which would be earned by setting the optimal
price). Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
model does not perform well, however, in the correlated environment. To illustrate this
point further, Table 17 shows the percent of maximum expected revenue earned by subjects
in each treatment. This quantity tells us how subjects fare relative to the benchmark of
revenue maximization. The table reinforces the conclusion that subjects do worse in the
correlated environment.
Two explanations for subjects’ difficulty in the correlated environment both gen-
erate testable models that can be taken to the data:
1. Subjects ignore correlation and set prices as if buyers’ values are independently drawn
from the ex post distribution of buyers’ values. The ex post distribution is the
unconditional distribution that ignores the common component µ, represented by the
following trapezoidal distribution, F˜ (v) =
0 v ∈ (−∞, 0)
v2
150 v ∈ [0, 5)
v
15 − 16 v ∈ [5, 15)
1− (20−v)2150 v ∈ [15, 20]
1 v ∈ (20,∞)
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The optimal prices satisfy equations III.3 and III.4 after plugging in the ex post
distribution.
2. Subjects incorrectly account for correlation in their pricing decisions. In particular,
subjects consider the optimal price to be the weighted average of the optimal prices
for each realization of µ. Informally, we can think of subjects taking the average of
the optimal price for a low value of µ and the optimal price for a high value of µ.
Formally, naive subjects set prices that satisfy the following two optimality conditions:
r =
∫ µ¯
µ
1− F (r|µ)
f(r|µ) g(µ)dµ
=
2ε
b− a
∫ b
a
(
1−
(
r − µ+ ε
2ε
))
dµ, (III.5)
p =
∫ µ¯
µ
1− F (p|µ)n
nF (p|µ)n−1f(p|µ)g(µ)dµ
=
2ε
b− a
∫ b
a
(
1− (p−µ+ε2ε )n
n
(p−µ+ε
2ε
)n−1
)
dµ. (III.6)
Both models predict prices in the uncorrelated environment that are equivalent
to the benchmark risk-neutral predictions because F (v) = F (v|µ) in this case. In the
correlated environment on the other hand, the prices predicted by the naive models are
not optimal. Also notice that, in both models, the correlated environment now inherits
the property of the uncorrelated environment that the reserve price is not a function of the
number of buyers. The predicted prices under the naive-pricing models are shown in Table
18.
The results suggest that the naive models are a better fit for the data than the
benchmark model. Both naive models match the comparative-static results in the corre-
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Table 18. Predicted versus Experimental Prices
Auction
Uncorrelated Correlated
2 Buyers 5 Buyers 2 Buyers 5 Buyers
Benchmark 10.00 10.00 6.00 5.45
Ignore Correlation 10.00 10.00 8.75 8.75
Misspecify Correlation 10.00 10.00 7.50 7.50
Results 9.766 10.057 7.983 8.377
(0.315) (0.428) (0.297) (0.342)
Posted Price
Benchmark 11.55 13.98 9.11 9.75
Ignore Correlation 11.55 13.98 10.37 12.60
Misspecify Correlation 11.55 13.98 9.34 11.32
Results 11.011 13.697 10.326 11.646
(0.224) (0.178) (0.181) (0.180)
Notes: The table displays the reserve and posted prices predicted by the three models as
well as subjects’ prices in the experiment. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
lated environment. To test between the two naive models, I compare prices levels. Non-
parametric medians tests provide more support for the ignore-correlation model. In the
auction market, I fail to reject that subjects follow the ignore-correlation model with two
buyers (z=1.13, p-value= 0.26) and five buyers (z=0.02, p-value=0.99). In the posted-price
market, I fail to reject with two buyers (z=0.08, p-value=0.94) but not with five buyers
(z=5.71, p-value=0.00). I reject the misspecify-correlation model in all correlated-values
treatments, except the five-buyers posted-price treatment (z=1.87, p-value=0.06), where
the misspecify-correlation model outperforms both the benchmark model and the ignore-
correlation model. In total however, the results are most favorable to the ignore-correlation
model.
Discussion
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The naive-pricing models proposed in this paper provide a better fit for the data
than the benchmark model of how sellers set prices in auction and posted-price markets.
The model that suggests sellers ignore the correlation among buyers’ values outperforms
both the benchmark and the model that suggests sellers incorrectly account for correlation.
It would be interesting to compare these results to work that uses field data. Do sellers in
naturally-occurring markets have similar difficulty in demand environments that are more
complex than the independent-private-values framework? Providing an answer requires
carefully isolating the causal link between correlation among buyers’ values and seller pricing
decisions. This is more easily done in the laboratory but it would be informative to bring
field data to bear on this question. Recent econometric developments show how to recover
the nature of correlation in the underlying demand structure (Li, Perrigne, and Vuong 2002).
Using these insights, studying the effect of correlation on pricing decisions is possible and
doing so would provide a worthwhile companion to this paper.
Appendix - Expected Revenues
Auction Market
In the correlated environment of the affiliated-signals model, expected auction
revenues can be expressed as follow. For r ∈ [0, 10]:
E(RevA) =
n
10
∫ 15
r+5
∫ µ+5
µ−5
(
v
10
+
v − µ+ 5
10
− 1
)(
v − µ+ 5
10
)n−1
dvdµ
+
n
10
∫ r+5
5
∫ µ+5
r
(
v
10
+
v − µ+ 5
10
− 1
)(
v − µ+ 5
10
)n−1
dvdµ.
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The first term on the right-hand side corresponds to µ − 5 ≥ r, while the second term on
the right-hand side corresponds to µ− 5 < r < 10. For r ∈ [10, 20]:
E(RevA) =
n
10
∫ 15
r−5
∫ µ+5
r
(
v
10
+
v − µ+ 5
10
− 1
)(
v − µ+ 5
10
)n−1
dvdµ.
Posted-Price Market
The optimal posted prices in the correlated environment of the affiliated-signals
model can be derived from the following parameterization of the expected posted-price
revenue function:
E(RevP ) =
1
10
∫ 15
5
p
(
1−
(
p− µ+ 5
10
)n)
dµ.
Appendix - Instructions
Today you will be participating in an experiment on how sellers set prices. You
will play the role of a seller and are asked to set a price. Pricing will take place in two
settings: an auction and a posted-price market. All monetary figures referred to in these
instructions and during the experiment are in experimental dollars. Experimental dollars
will be converted to American dollars at the end of the experiment and your take-home
earnings will be paid in American dollars, including a $5 show-up payment.
In the auction market, you, as the seller, will select a minimum bid. Bidding will
begin at this price and no bids will be accepted below this amount. Buyers will see your
minimum bid and are asked to place their bid. If no buyer enters a bid above your minimum
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bid, your item does not sell. Your profit on an unsold item is 0. If one and only one buyer
enters a bid above your minimum bid, this buyer wins the auction and pays the minimum
bid. In this case, your profit is the dollar value of your minimum bid. Finally, if more than
one buyer enters a bid above your minimum bid, the highest bidder wins the auction and
pays a price equal to the second-highest bid. In this case, your profit is the dollar value
of the second-highest bid. For this reason, this type of auction is known as a second-price
auction.
In the posted-price market, you will select a price to charge. Buyers will see your
posted price and are asked whether or not they wish to buy the item. If no buyer chooses
to buy your item, it does not sell. Your profit on an unsold item is 0. If at least one buyer
chooses to buy your item, it sells at the posted price you selected. In this case, your profit
is the dollar value of your posted price.
In today’s experiment, the role of buyers will be performed by a computer. These
simulated buyers will be assigned a value for your item. The term “value” refers to the
maximum amount that a particular buyer is willing to pay; these values are unknown to
you, the seller. The computer will assign a value to each buyer randomly in a particular
way that will be described below. In the auction, the computer will then enter a bid for
each buyer in the amount of that buyer’s value. In the posted-price market, the computer
will indicate that a buyer is willing to purchase your item if the price is below that buyer’s
value. The computer will indicate that the buyer is unwilling to purchase if the price is
above that buyer’s value.
We will now describe how buyers’ values are determined. Buyers’ values are de-
termined in one of two environments:
81
A. For a portion of the experiment, values will be randomly selected from the integers
between 0 and 20 inclusive (0,1,2,. . . ,18,19,20), with each integer being equally likely.
Buyers’ values will be reselected after each round, meaning that buyers will have a
new value during each round.
B. For the remaining portion of the experiment, values will be determined in two steps:
first a single number (that we will call X) is randomly selected from the integers
between 5 and 15 inclusive (5,6,7,. . . ,13,14,15), with each integer being equally likely;
onceX is selected, buyers’ values are then randomly selected from the integers between
X-5 and X+5 inclusive, with each integer being equally likely. X will be reselected
after each round. Buyers’ values will also be reselected after each round. You will not
be told X until after the round is completed.
Once you choose your minimum bid or price, values will be determined and you
will be informed of your profits for the round. During the course of the experiment, you will
sometimes be pricing in environment A, other times in environment B but it will always be
made clear to you how values are being chosen before you set your price. The number of
buyers to whom you are selling will also change but the number of buyers will also always
be made clear to you before you set your price. Your take-home earnings depend entirely
on your pricing decisions and are not affected by the actions of the other subjects in the
room.
The conversion rate between experimental dollars and American dollars is 10 to
1. The take-home earnings that you receive for participating in this experiment will be
based on 10 randomly-selected rounds during the experiment. You will not be made aware
of which rounds are used to determine your take-home earnings until the experiment is
completed. The first several rounds of each environment will be practice rounds. These
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rounds will not be used to determine your take-home earnings. You should use them to
insure that you understand the environment and how to earn the highest profits. It will be
made clear to you when you are pricing in the rounds that will be used to determine your
take-home earnings. Do you have any questions?
Appendix - Measuring the Degree of Risk Aversion
Holt and Laury (2002) devise a procedure for eliciting risk preferences based on
presenting subjects with a menu of lotteries. Table 19 reproduces their Table 1, with payoffs
scaled up by a factor of four so that the expected payoff from the lottery experiment matches
the expected payoff of the pricing experiment. I scale the payoffs because measuring risk
aversion has been shown to depend critically on the stakes (Holt and Laury 2002). Subjects
see the probabilities and payoffs associated with each option but not the expected payoff
difference.
As argued in their original paper, the Holt-Laury procedure allow the researcher
to measure a subject’s risk preferences based on the decision (or the row in Table 19) at
which the subject switched from Option A (the “safe” option) to Option B (the “risky”
option). As the tenth decision involves a higher payoff with probability 1, subjects should
choose Option B at some point in the sequence. Fairly weak assumptions on preferences
would imply that subjects switch from Option A to Option B only once (or choose Option
B in all decisions).
I use the results from the Holt-Laury procedure in two ways: (1) to group subjects
according to the decision at which they first switched from Option A (the safe option) to
Option B (the risky option); and (2) to group subjects according to the number of times
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Table 19. Holt-Laury Risk Elicitation Procedure
Expected Payoff
Option A Option B Difference
1/10 of $8.00, 9/10 of $6.40 1/10 of $15.40, 9/10 of $0.40 $4.66
2/10 of $8.00, 8/10 of $6.40 2/10 of $15.40, 8/10 of $0.40 $3.32
3/10 of $8.00, 7/10 of $6.40 3/10 of $15.40, 7/10 of $0.40 $1.98
4/10 of $8.00, 6/10 of $6.40 4/10 of $15.40, 6/10 of $0.40 $0.64
5/10 of $8.00, 5/10 of $6.40 5/10 of $15.40, 5/10 of $0.40 -$0.70
6/10 of $8.00, 4/10 of $6.40 6/10 of $15.40, 4/10 of $0.40 -$2.04
7/10 of $8.00, 3/10 of $6.40 7/10 of $15.40, 3/10 of $0.40 -$3.38
8/10 of $8.00, 2/10 of $6.40 8/10 of $15.40, 2/10 of $0.40 -$4.72
9/10 of $8.00, 1/10 of $6.40 9/10 of $15.40, 1/10 of $0.40 -$6.06
10/10 of $8.00, 0/10 of $6.40 10/10 of $15.40, 0/10 of $0.40 -$7.40
Notes: The payoffs have been scaled up by a factor of four such that the expected payoff
matches the expected payoff of the pricing experiment.
they switched between options. Subjects switching between Option A and Option B later
in the sequence may reasonably be considered more risk averse, even without an exact
estimation of their degree of risk aversion (which would depend on the function form of
risk preferences). Subjects switching between Option A and Option B multiple times may
reasonably be considered to have “different” behavior from those switching only once, either
because of differences in their preferences or because they are less attentive. Under either
interpretation, it is useful to check for differences across subjects who switched only once
and those switching multiple times.
Risk neutrality predicts four safe choices, followed by six risky choices. The results
of the lottery experiment can be summarized as follows:
• When considering the decision at which subjects first switched to the risky lottery,
four subjects switched at decision two, one at decision three, seven at decision four,
thirteen at decision five, four at decision six, four at decision seven, and two at decision
eight.
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• Nine subjects (25.7% of thirty five) switched between the safe and risky lotteries more
than once. Four switched twice and one switched three times.
• The decision of the first switch and the number of switches are uncorrelated with price
levels, which is surprising given that all three model detailed in this paper predicted
lower prices in both markets as the degree of risk aversion increases.
Appendix - Screenshots
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Figure 4. Screenshot of the Pre-Experiment Quiz
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Figure 5. Screenshot of a Pricing Environment
Figure 6. Screenshot of the Feedback from a Practice Round with a Sold Item
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Figure 7. Screenshot of the Feedback from a Round with an Unsold Item
Figure 8. Screenshot of the Results Page
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